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ABSTRACT
IZA DP No. 12045 DECEMBER 2018
Wage Insurance, Part-Time Unemployment 
Insurance and Short-Time Work in the XXI 
Century
At the start of the XXI century, characterized by the rise of new forms of employment 
and of skills requirements, many countries need to adapt their labor market institutions 
to accompany technological changes and globalization. In this context, unemployment 
insurance is an essential tool to foster and smooth career paths. Its core components 
comprise unemployment benefits paid to full-time unemployed workers, monitoring, and 
counseling. But it is clear that they are not sufficient to cover all risks properly. To deal with 
this issue, part-time unemployment insurance, short-time work and wage insurance have 
been tried, at different scales, in several countries over the last decades. This paper surveys 
the evaluations of these schemes and draws lessons from their results for future research 
and for labor market institutions.
JEL Classification: H5, J6
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Introduction2	  	  	  	  The	  reallocation	  of	  jobs	  is	  a	  huge	  process	  in	  all	  countries.	  In	  advanced	  economies,	  about	  15%	  of	   jobs	   are	   destroyed	   every	   year	   and	   about	   the	   same	   proportion	   is	   created.	   The	  reallocation	   of	   jobs	   is	   accompanied	   by	   an	   even	   more	   important	   reallocation	   of	  manpower	   across	   jobs.	   This	   phenomenon	   is	   an	   essential	   ingredient	   of	   productivity	  growth.	   It	   is	   linked	   to	   globalization	   and	   technological	   progress,	   which	   create	   new	  products	  and	  new	  business	  models,	   likely	  to	   foster	  growth	  and	  improve	  well-­‐being	  for	  all.	  But	  this	  structural	  change	  also	  has	  social	  costs.	  It	  is	  well	  established	  that	  job	  loss	  can	  have	  significant	  detrimental	  effects	  on	  the	  earnings	  of	  individuals	  for	  decades,	  especially	  for	   long-­‐tenured	  workers	  who	   are	   then	   dislocated.	   This	   is	   observed	   in	   the	   US,	  where	  earning	   inequalities	   are	   drastic	   and	   where	   the	   welfare	   state	   is	   limited,	   but	   also	   in	  European	  countries,	  where	  the	  social	  safety	  net	  is	  tighter	  and	  earnings	  inequalities	  are	  more	   compressed.3	  Technological	   progress	   changes	   the	   nature	   of	   jobs	   too.	   With	   the	  automation	   of	   tasks	   and	   the	   spread	   of	   online	   platforms,	   the	   new	   economy	   reshapes	  workplaces,	   inducing	   a	   substantial	   rise	   in	   the	   incidence	   of	   such	   alternative	   work	  arrangements	  as	  temporary	  work,	  part-­‐time	  work,	  self-­‐employment,	  and	  the	  new	  kinds	  of	  work	  relationship	  emerging	  in	  the	  “online	  gig	  economy”.4	  These	  changes	  offer	  a	  host	  of	   opportunities	   for	   more	   employee-­‐friendly	   options	   such	   as	   flexible	   schedules	   and	  working	   from	   home,	  which	   can	   favor	   the	   entry	   of	   persons,	   in	   particular	  women	  with	  young	   children,	   who	   might	   have	   experienced	   barriers	   to	   entering	   the	   traditional	  workforce.5	  But	  they	  also	  raise	  concerns	  about	  job	  quality	  and	  stability.	  	  	  With	  the	  rise	  in	  new	  forms	  of	  employment	  and	  in	  skills	  requirements,	  growing	  numbers	  of	   individuals	   need	   a	   system	   that	   will	   provide	   them	   with	   a	   degree	   of	   support	   in	  maintaining	   a	   flow	   of	   income	   and	   transitioning	   between	   jobs.	   In	   this	   context,	  unemployment	  insurance	  plays	  a	  key	  role.	  By	  allowing	  workers	  to	  smooth	  consumption	  when	   they	   lose	   their	   jobs	   and	   by	   providing	   resources	   to	   help	   them	   look	   for	   jobs	   and	  acquire	  new	  skills,	  unemployment	  insurance	  can	  improve	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  workers	  and	  can	  facilitate	  their	  reallocation	  towards	  more	  productive	  jobs.	  	  	  Unemployment	   insurance	   provides	   benefits	   to	   unemployed	  workers	   providing	   certain	  well-­‐known	   conditions	   of	   entitlement	   are	   met.	   	   The	   recipient	   must	   have	   paid	   in	  contributions	   for	   a	   minimum	   amount	   of	   time	   while	   employed.	   He	   or	   she	   must	   hunt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	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actively	  for	  a	  job	  while	  on	  benefits	  and	  this	  activity	  may	  be	  monitored.	  The	  refusal	  of	  a	  job	  offer	  or	  of	  participation	  in	  active	  labor	  market	  policy	  placement	  may	  be	  sanctioned.	  These	  features	  are	  easy	  to	  interpret	  when	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  distinguish	  unemployment	  from	  employment.	  	  	  However,	  in	  many	  situations	  the	  difference	  between	  unemployment	  and	  employment	  is	  not	  clear.	  For	  instance,	  with	  the	  rise	  in	  alternative	  work	  arrangements,	  more	  and	  more	  people	   entitled	   to	   unemployment	   benefits	   are	   finding	   temporary	   jobs	   of	   very	   short	  duration.	  This	  means	  that	  many	  people	  are	  likely	  to	  enter	  and	  exit	  unemployment	  with	  high	  frequency.	  At	  the	  limit,	  unemployed	  persons	  may	  have	  paid	  work	  one	  day,	  	  but	  have	  an	  entitlement	  to	  the	  dole	  for	  the	  next	  day;	  and	  this	  state	  of	  alternation	  may	  persist.	  In	  this	   situation,	  what	   should	  be	   the	   entitlement	   conditions	  of	   an	   efficient	   insurance?	  To	  deal	  with	   this	   type	  of	   situation,	  many	  unemployment	   insurance	   systems	  use	  part-­‐time	  
unemployment	   benefits,	   which	   enable	   claimants	   to	   keep	   part	   of	   their	   unemployment	  benefits	  while	  earning	  low	  income	  (paying	  less	  than	  the	  unemployment	  benefits)	   from	  work.	   In	   several	   countries,	   the	   unemployment	   benefits	   which	   are	   not	   paid	   to	   the	  claimant	   while	   she	   is	   working	   create	   the	   right	   to	   extend	   the	   potential	   duration	   of	  unemployment	   benefits.	   Part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance	   induces	   unemployed	  workers	  to	  accept	  part-­‐time	  jobs,	  or	  jobs	  of	  short	  duration,	  that	  they	  might	  have	  had	  to	  refuse	  if	  the	  unemployment	  benefits	  eligibility	  rules	  required	  that	  recipients	  have	  zero	  labor	  earnings.	  Wage	  insurance	  programs,	  which	  provide	  a	  temporary	  wage	  supplement	  that	  partially	  reduces	  the	  wage	  loss	  experienced	  by	  newly	  reemployed	  workers	  also	  aim	  at	  inducing	  unemployed	  workers	  to	  accept	  low-­‐paid	  jobs.	  	  Wage	  insurance	  differs	  from	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  because	  individuals	  are	  no	  longer	  recipients	  of	  unemployment	  benefits	  once	  they	  have	  been	  reemployed	  in	  wage	  insurance	  programs,	  whereas	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  allows	  unemployment	  benefits	  recipients	  to	  earn	  income	  from	  work	  without	  losing	  their	  benefits.	  In	  practice,	  wage	   insurance	   is	   generally	   targeted	   at	   permanently	   long-­‐tenured	   workers	   who	   find	  themselves	  displaced.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2016,	  President	  Obama	  proposed	  wage	  insurance	  as	  a	  program	  for	  helping	  all	  dislocated	  workers	  as	  they	  recover	  from	  the	  permanent	  loss	  of	   a	   job.	   He	   argued	   that	   if	   a	   “hardworking	   American	   loses	   his	   job—we	   shouldn’t	   just	  make	  sure	  that	  he	  can	  get	  unemployment	  insurance;	  we	  should	  make	  sure	  that	  program	  encourages	  him	  to	  retrain	  for	  a	  business	  that’s	  ready	  to	  hire	  him.	  If	  that	  new	  job	  doesn’t	  pay	  as	  much,	  there	  should	  be	  a	  system	  of	  wage	  insurance	  in	  place	  so	  that	  he	  can	  still	  pay	  his	  bills”.6	  	  The	   case	   for	   wage	   insurance	   is	   motivated	   by	   the	   large	   wage	   losses	   of	   long-­‐tenured	  displaced	  workers.	  Short-­‐time	  work	  programs	  can	  also	  mitigate	  such	  losses.	  Short-­‐time	  work	   is	   a	   temporary	   reduction	   in	   working	   time	   intended	   to	   maintain	   an	   existing	  employer/employee	  relationship.	  It	  involves	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  normal	  hours	  worked	  for	  a	   limited	   period	   of	   time.	   Many	   unemployment	   insurance	   systems	   provide	   short-­‐time	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Barack	  Obama,	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address,	  January	  12,	  2016,	  quoted	  by	  Wandner	  (2016).	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work	   compensation	   to	   employees	   whose	   hours	   of	   work	   are	   reduced	   to	   avoid	   job	  destruction	  and	  the	  subsequent	  wage	  losses	  of	  displaced	  workers.	  	  	  Part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance,	   wage	   insurance	   and	   short-­‐time	   work	   can	   be	  complementary	   schemes	   useful	   to	   efficiently	   insure	   workers	   against	   uncertainty.	  However,	  designing	  effective	  schemes	  of	   these	   types	   is	  not	  an	  easy	   task	  because	   there	  are	  important	  selection	  and	  moral	  hazard	  issues,	  as	  in	  all	  insurance	  systems.	  	  Moral	  hazard	  implies	  that	  it	  is	  efficient	  to	  provide	  only	  partial	  compensations	  for	  income	  drops	   associated	   with	   job	   losses	   in	   order	   to	   create	   incentives	   to	   look	   for	   other	   jobs.	  	  More	   generally,	   moral	   hazard	   limits	   the	   possibility	   of	   insuring	   against	   income	   losses.	  	  This	  implies	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  adapt	  the	  eligibility	  for	  unemployment	  benefits	  to	  the	  diverse	  forms	  of	  work	  arrangements.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  qualify	  platform	  workers	  for	  unemployment	  insurance	  benefits,	  given	  the	  discretion	  they	  have	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  work	  or	  not.	  This	  should	  require	  to	  define	  their	  eligibility	  for	  unemployment	  benefits	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  specific	  criteria.7	  	  Adverse	   selection	   implies	   that	   insurance	  attracts	   individuals	  with	  high	  unemployment	  risk.	  This	  high	  risk	  may	  be	  external	  and	  objective,	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  strong	  	  instability	  	  of	  	  jobs,	   but	   it	  may	  also	  be	   internal,	   arising	  out	  of	  human	   subjectivity	   and	   creating	  moral	  hazard	   issues.	   For	   instance,	   	   the	   creation	   	   of	   	   unemployment	   insurance	   for	   platform	  workers	  may	  make	   this	   form	   of	  work	   arrangement	  more	   attractive.	   If	   unemployment	  insurance	   provides	   high	   replacement	   incomes	   and	   loose	   entitlement	   conditions	   to	  platform	   workers,	   the	   platform	   economy	   may	   become	   inefficiently	   large,	   because	   it	  would	  in	  effect	  	  be	  receiving	  a	  subsidy	  from	  the	  unemployment	  insurance	  system.	  	  This	  could	  become	  a	  significant	  problem	  if	  platform	  workers	  were	  to	  mobilize	  collectively	  to	  defend	   their	   interests	   once	   this	   inefficient	   system	   is	   in	   place.	   	   We	   will	   see	   that	   this	  scenario	   is	  not	  pure	   science	   fiction,	   insofar	   as	   it	   illustrates	   the	   situation	  of	   artists	   and	  technicians	  of	  the	  entertainment	  sector	  in	  France.	  	  Beyond	   these	   general	   considerations,	   one	   needs	   to	   know	   in	   detail	   how	   systems	  work	  and	   how	   people	   behave	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   systemic	   impacts	   and	   thus	   be	   in	   a	  position	  to	  evaluate	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  policies.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  survey	  the	  available	  information	  on	  these	  issues.	  It	  reviews	  how	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits,	  short-­‐time	  work	  and	  	  wage	  insurance	  function	  in	  different	  OECD	  countries	  and	  what	  is	  known	  about	   their	   impact,	   both	   from	  a	   theoretical	   and	  an	   empirical	   perspective.	   	   The	  paper	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  The	  first	  section	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  description	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance,	  wage	  insurance,	  and	  short-­‐time	  work	  in	  the	  OECD	  countries.	  The	   consequences	   of	   these	   schemes	   are	   discussed	   from	   a	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	  perspective	  in	  section	  2	  and	  3	  respectively.	  Section	  4	  supplies	  concluding	  comments.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Harris	  and	  Krueger	  (2015).	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1.	  Part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits,	  wage	  insurance	  and	  short-­‐time	  work	  in	  the	  
OECD	  countries	  
	  This	   section	   presents	   the	   institutional	   features	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance,	  wage	  insurance,	  and	  short-­‐time	  work	  in	  the	  OECD	  countries.	  For	  each	  national	  scheme,	  it	  contrasts	  	  features	  that	  are	  common	  across	  countries	  to	  features	  that	  are	  idiosyncratic.	  	  
1.1.	  Part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  regulations	  	  Part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  refers	  to	  benefits	  paid	  to	  persons	  working	  part	  time	  who	  have	  lost	  a	  full-­‐time	  job	  or	  an	  additional	  part-­‐time	  one,	  and	  are	  seeking	  a	  new	  job	  in	  order	  to	  work	  more	  hours.	  This	  scheme	  is	  different	  from	  short-­‐time	  work,	  which	  refers	  to	   benefits	   compensating	   for	   the	   loss	   of	   wage	   or	   salary	   due	   to	   short-­‐time	   working	  arrangements,	   and/or	   intermittent	   work	   schedules,	   where	   the	   employer/employee	  relationship	   continues.8 	  Part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   exist	   in	   many	   European	  countries	   and	   in	   North-­‐America.	   However,	   their	   design	   is	   very	   heterogeneous	   across	  countries.	  	  	  	  	  
The	  coverage	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  	  	  Table	   1	   reports	   the	   share	   of	   the	   labor	   force	   covered	   by	   public	   schemes	   organized	   to	  provide	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  in	  OECD	  countries	  in	  2015.	  It	  also	  reports	  the	  public	  expenditure	  on	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits.	  The	  coverage	  and	  expenditure	  on	  public	  schemes	  providing	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  are	  positive	  in	  only	  four	  countries:	  Belgium,	  Finland,	  Portugal	  and	  Sweden.	  However,	  this	  information	  	  yields	  	  no	  more	  than	  a	  partial	  view	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance,	  for	  in	  many	  countries	  unemployment	  insurance	  is	  managed	  by	  social	  partners	  relying	  on	  semi-­‐public	  or	  private	  organizations.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  complementary	  information,	  Figure	  1	  reports	  the	  share	  of	  the	  labor	  force	  employed	  and	  registered	  at	  a	  public	  employment	  office	   and	   receiving	   benefit	   or	   assistance,	   in	   European	   countries.	   This	   is	   an	   extensive	  definition	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  some	  employees	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  There	   are	   some	   variations	   in	   the	   terminology	   concerning	   these	   schemes.	   According	   to	   the	   OECD	  	  statistical	  web	  site,	  «	  Partial	  unemployment	  benefits	  »	  refers	  to	  benefits	  compensating	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  wage	  or	   salary	   due	   to	   short-­‐time	   working	   arrangements,	   and/or	   intermittent	   work	   schedules,	   where	   the	  employer/employee	   relationship	   continues.	  Nevertheless,	   this	   type	  of	   scheme	   is	  usually	   	   called	  «	   short-­‐time	  work	  »	  or	  «	  short-­‐time	  compensation	  ».	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  adopt	  the	  terminology	  «	  Short-­‐time	  work	  »	  to	  designate	  this	  type	  of	  scheme.	  According	  to	  the	  OECD	  statistical	  web	  site,	   	  «	  Part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	   »	   refers	   to	   benefits	   paid	   to	   persons	   working	   part-­‐time	   who	   have	   lost	   a	   full-­‐time	   job	   or	   an	  additional	  part-­‐time	  one,	  and	  are	  seeking	  to	  work	  more	  hours.	  We	  keep	  this	  terminology	  in	  this	  paper.	  It	  should	  be	  remarked	  that	  some	  papers	  call	  this	  type	  of	  scheme	  «	  partial	  unemployment	  benefits	  ».	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short	  or	  part-­‐time	  jobs	  may	  receive	  assistance	  but	  not	  unemployment	  benefits.	  But	  this	  is	   likely	   a	   small	   fraction	   of	   all	   part-­‐time	   unemployed	   workers	   registered	   at	   public	  employment	   services.	   Using	   this	   definition	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance,	   we	  see	  that	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  is	  in	  fact	  present	  in	  many	  countries	  where	  there	  is	  no	  specific	  scheme	  for	  public	  expenditure	  on	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits.	  Nevertheless,	  its	  importance	  is	  limited.	  It	  covers	  less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  labor	  force	  in	   all	   countries,	   except	   in	   Belgium	   (3.6%),	   France	   (2.5%)	   ,	   Finland	   (1.8%),	   Austria	  (1.4%)	  and	  Germany	  (1.1%).	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Table	  1	  	  Short-­‐time	  work	  and	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  in	  2015.	  These	  data	  cover	  schemes	  fundedd	  
by	  public	  expenditure.	  Some	  schemes	  funded	  by	  unemployment	  insurance	  systems	  are	  not	  accounted	  for	  by	  
these	  data.	  Source	  :	  OECD.	  
Country	   Short-­‐time	  work	  




benefits	  (%	  of	  the	  labor	  
force)	  
Public	  expenditures	  for	  
short-­‐time	  work	  (%	  of	  
GDP)	  
Public	  expenditures	  for	  
part-­‐time	  
unemployment	  (%	  of	  
GDP)	  
Australia	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Austria	   .07	   0	   .01	   0	  
Belgium	   2.47	   .87	   .12	   .05	  
Canada	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Chile	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Czech	  Republic	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Denmark	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Estonia	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Finland	   .07	   1.6	   .01	   .18	  
France	   .19	   0	   .01	   0	  
Germany	   .18	   0	   .02	   0	  
Greece	   .02	   0	   0	   0	  
Hungary	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Ireland	   .06	   0	   0	   0	  
Israel	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Italy	   .57	   0	   .28	   0	  
Japan	   	  	   	  	   0	   0	  
Korea	   	  	   	  	   0	   0	  
Latvia	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Lithuania	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Luxembourg	   .82	   0	   .04	   0	  
Mexico	   	  	   	  	   0	   0	  
Netherlands	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
New	  Zealand	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Norway	   	  	   	  	   .04	   .07	  
OECD	   	  	   	  	   .02	   .01	  
Poland	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Portugal	   .02	   .28	   0	   .02	  
Slovak	  Republic	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Slovenia	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
Spain	   .05	   0	   .02	   0	  
Sweden	   0	   .89	   0	   .03	  
Switzerland	   .17	   0	   .02	   0	  
United	  Kingdom	   	  0	   0	  	   	  	   	  	  
United	  States	   	  0	   0	  	   0	   0	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Figure	   1	  :	   Part-­‐time	   unemployment	   and	   unemployment	   rates	   in	   European	   countries	   where	   part-­‐time	  
unemployment	   exists.	   Part-­‐time	  unemployed	  persons	  are	  employed	  and	   registered	  at	   a	  public	   employment	  
office	  and	  are	  receiving	  benefit	  or	  assistance.	  Year	  2016,	  except	  2013	  for	  Germany	  .	  	  	  
	  
Strong	  heterogeneity	  of	  programs	  across	  countries	  	  The	  design	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  is	  very	  heterogeneous	  across	  the	  OECD	  countries.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  diversity	  of	  rules	  concerning	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  current	  earnings	  of	  individuals	  from	  short	  or	  part-­‐time	  employment	  and	  current	  unemployment	  benefits,	   about	   the	   implications	   of	   current	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   on	   future	  unemployment	   benefits	   entitlement,	   and	   about	   	   the	   duration	   of	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits.	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be	  very	  high,	  up	   to	  100%.	   	  There	   is	  a	  disregard	   in	  Australia,	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Canada,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Germany,	  Luxembourg,	  Poland,	  the	  U.K.	  and	  in	  several	  U.S.	  states.	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  second	  type	  of	  rule,	  unemployment	  benefits	  are	  reduced	  in	  proportion	  to	   all	   labor	   earnings,	   or	   hours	   worked	   (in	   Denmark,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   Norway),	  during	  the	  reference	  period,	  without	  any	  level	  of	  disregard.	  The	  benefit-­‐reduction	  rate	  is	  generally	  smaller	  than	  100%	  as	  long	  as	  labor	  earnings	  are	  below	  the	  previous	  monthly	  or	   weekly	   wage.	   Above	   this	   threshold,	   the	   benefit	   reduction	   rate	   is	   equal	   to	   100%,	  meaning	  that	  no	  unemployment	  benefits	  are	  paid	  during	  the	  reference	  period.	  	  There	  is	  no	  disregard	  in	  Denmark,	  Finland,	  France,	  Greece,	  Hungary,	  Ireland,	  Israel,	  Italy,	  Japan,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Portugal,	  Slovak	  Republic,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland	  and	  in	  several	  U.S.	  states.	  	  	  Figure	  2	  displays	  examples	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  income	  and	  labor	  earnings	  in	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  systems	  with	  and	  without	  disregard.	  The	  benefit-­‐reduction	  rate	   is	   equal	   to	   zero	   below	   the	   disregard.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   disregard,	   the	   benefit-­‐reduction	   rate	   is	   positive,	   hence	   individuals	   have	   less	   incentive	   to	   works	   for	   these	  earnings	   levels,	   than	   in	   systems	   with	   disregard.	   However,	   in	   general,	   the	   situation	   is	  reversed	  for	  earnings	  above	  the	  disregard:	  the	  benefit-­‐reduction	  rate	  is	  generally	  larger	  (it	  is	  equal	  to	  100%	  in	  our	  example,	  as	  this	  is	  the	  case	  in	  several	  countries)	  compared	  to	  systems	  without	  disregard.	  This	  means	  that	   individuals	  have	   less	   incentive	  to	   increase	  labor	  earnings	  at	  earnings	  levels	  above	  the	  disregards	  than	  they	  do	  in	  systems	  without	  disregards.	  	  	  In	  several	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  systems,	  no	  benefits	  are	  paid	  if	  the	  earnings	  of	   an	   individual	   are	   above	   the	   reference	   income	   used	   to	   compute	   unemployment	  benefits.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  income	  of	  an	  individual	  can	  drop	  when	  earnings	  increase	  above	  this	  level	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  right-­‐hand	  side	  graphs	  of	  figure	  2.	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Figure	  2	  :	  The	  relation	  between	  earnings	  and	  income	  in	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  system	  with	  and	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recipients	   and	   that	   of	   non-­‐recipients	   decreases	  with	   the	   income	   level	   in	   this	   earnings	  interval.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	   3	  :	   Annual	   net	   income	   and	   gross	   income	   for	   single	   wage-­‐earners	   paid	   the	   hourly	   average	   wage	   in	  
Germany	   and	   eligible	   for	   unemployment	   insurance	   benefits	   (left	   graph)	  ;	   and	   for	   workers	   not	   eligible	   for	  
unemployment	  insurance	  benefits	  (right	  graph).	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  net	  income	  and	  the	  gross	  income	  
takes	  into	  account	  income	  taxes,	  social	  security	  contributions,	  social	  assistance	  or	  minimum	  income	  benefits,	  
housing-­‐related	  cash	  benefits,	  family	  benefits,	  and	  in-­‐work	  or	  employment-­‐conditional	  benefits.	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once	  the	  current	  period	  is	  exhausted,	  provided	  that	  at	  least	  610	  hours	  have	  been	  worked	  over	  the	  last	  28	  months	  (36	  months	  for	  individuals	  over	  53	  years	  old).	  This	  means	  that	  one	  day	  of	  work	  can	  yield	  entitlement	  to	  two	  days	  of	  unemployment	  benefits.	  	  In	   other	   countries	   (e.g.	   Germany,	   Hungary,	   Portugal),	   unpaid	   benefits	   are	   not	   carried	  forward	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  of	  benefit	  entitlement.	  However,	  the	  income	  earned	  by	  part-­‐time	   unemployed	   workers	   does	   allow	   them	   to	   get	   eligibility	   for	   new	   periods	   of	  benefit	  entitlement.	  	  	  	  
Duration	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  	  Part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  could	  induce	  unemployed	  workers	  to	  remain	  in	  short	  or	   part-­‐time	   jobs	   instead	   of	   striving	   to	   access	   regular	   employment.	   In	   general,	   the	  duration	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   is	   limited	   by	   the	   potential	   duration	   of	  unemployment	  benefit	  entitlement.	  But	  this	  potential	  duration	  can	  be	  extended	  by	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  if	  the	  benefits	  which	  are	  not	  paid	  to	  claimants	  for	  periods	  in	  which	  they	  work	   are	   carried	   forward	   to	   the	   end	   of	   the	   period	   of	   benefit	   entitlement.	   In	   this	  case,	   the	   periods	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefit	   entitlement	   can	   be	   significantly	  lengthened.	  It	   is	  possible	  to	  lengthen	  these	  periods	  even	  more	  if	  the	  income	  earned	  by	  part-­‐time	  unemployed	  workers	  allows	  them	  to	  start	  new	  periods	  of	  benefit	  entitlement.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   limit	   the	   possibility	   that	   individuals	   remain	   entitled	   to	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  for	  long	  periods,	  several	  systems	  limit	  their	  potential	  duration.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Denmark,	  the	  right	  to	  supplementary	  unemployment	  benefits	  is	  limited	  to	   30	   weeks	   within	   the	   last	   104	   weeks.	   However,	   these	   limitations	   are	   not	   always	  effective.	  For	   instance,	   in	  France,	   the	  duration	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  was	   limited	  to	  15	  months	  until	  2014.	  This	   threshold	  applied	   to	   the	  current	  unemployment	  benefit	  entitlement,	   meaning	   that	   unemployed	   workers	   could	   not	   be	   in	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   more	   than	   15	   months	   within	   one	   period	   of	   unemployment	   benefit	  entitlement.	  But	  as	  the	  previous	  periods	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  were	  not	  taken	  into	  account	   when	   new	   periods	   of	   benefits	   entitlement	   were	   started,	   the	   15	   months	  threshold	   was	   not	   very	   effective.	   More	   precisely,	   thanks	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	  commencing	  new	  periods	  of	  entitlement	  with	  a	  clean	  slate,	  working	  at	   least	  one	  out	  of	  two	   days	   on	   average	   opened	   the	   possibility	   of	   remaining	   entitled	   to	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   benefits	   indefinitely.	   It	   turns	   out	   that	   around	   760,000	   people	   —	  corresponding	  to	  about	  one	  fourth	  of	  unemployment	  insurance	  benefit	  recipients	  —who	  alternate	  between	   jobs	   and	  periods	   receiving	  unemployment	  benefit,	   have	  on	   average	  spent	  five	  years	  entitled	  to	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	   in	  2015.	  These	  recurrent	  claimants	  work	  one	  out	  of	  two	  days	  on	  average.	  Each	  of	  these	  760,000	  claimants	  costs	  around	  6,300	  euros	  per	  year	  to	  the	  unemployment	  insurance	  system.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Cahuc	  and	  Prost	  (2015).	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1.2.	  Wage	  insurance	  regulations	  	  Wage	   insurance	  provides	  partial	   replacement	  of	   lost	  wages	   to	  displaced	  workers	  who	  accept	  pay	  cuts.	  Wage	   insurance	  benefits	  are	   temporary	  and	  are	  reserved	   for	  workers	  who	   face	  wage	   losses	   when	   they	   change	   jobs.	  Wage	   insurance	   differs	   from	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  insofar	  as	  it	  provides	  compensation	  not	  only	  for	  short	  or	  part-­‐time	  jobs,	  but	  also	  for	  full-­‐time	  jobs	  if	  the	  remuneration	  of	  the	  new	  job	  is	  smaller	  than	  that	  of	  the	  previous	  job.	  	  	  As	   shown	   above,	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance	   exists	   in	   many	   countries.	   Many	  countries	   also	   use	   permanent	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   to	   incentivize	   unemployed	  workers	   to	  accept	  low	  paid	  jobs.	  Time-­‐limited	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  are	  more	  scarce.	  10	  Most	  of	  them	  are	  targeted	   at	   unemployed	   welfare	   recipients.	   Wage	   insurance	   schemes	   are	   even	   more	  scarce.11	  Their	   size	   is	   generally	   very	   small	   and	   they	   can	   be	   part	   of	   programs	   which	  include	  other	  components,	  especially	  job	  search	  assistance	  and	  training.	  	  	  	  The	   US	   Trade	   Adjustment	   Assistance	   (TAA)	   is	   a	   federal	   transfer	   program	   established	  under	  the	  1962	  Trade	  Expansion	  Act	  which	  provides	  assistance	  to	  workers	  permanently	  separated	   from	   their	   jobs	   due	   to	   international	   trade.	   The	   program	   aimed	   at	   coupling	  trade	   liberalization	   with	   insurance	   for	   adversely	   affected	   workers.	   The	   TAA	   was	  amended	   several	   times.	   However,	   since	   2002,	   TAA	   expenditure	   on	   wage	   insurance	  benefits	   has	   remained	   relatively	   stable.	   To	   receive	   TAA	   benefits	   workers	   must	   file	  petitions	  at	  the	  Department	  of	  Labor.	  TAA	  eligibility	  is	  granted	  by	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Labor,	   which	   applies	   statutory	   criteria	   to	   determine	   whether	   foreign	   trade	   was	   an	  important	   cause	   of	   the	   threatened	  or	   actual	   job	   loss	   or	  wage	   reduction.	   TAA	   contains	  several	  program	  components.	  It	  provides	  benefits	  up	  to	  $10,000	  for	  workers	  enrolled	  in	  training	   programs,	   up	   to	   a	   maximum	   of	   three	   years.	   Recipients	   are	   also	   entitled	   to	  expended	  unemployment	  insurance	  benefits	  while	  training.	  In	  the	  interest	  of	  promoting	  rapid	  re-­‐employment,	  and	  because	  training	  may	  not	  pay	  off	  for	  older	  workers,	  the	  Trade	  Act	   of	   2002	   established	   a	   wage	   insurance	   program,	   called	   the	   Alternative	   Trade	  Adjustment	  Assistance	  for	  Older	  Workers	  (ATAA).	  TAA-­‐certified	  workers	  age	  50	  or	  older	  can	  get	  ATAA	  wage	  subsidies	  if	  they	  obtain	  full-­‐time	  jobs	  that	  pay	  no	  more	  than	  $50,000,	  earn	   less	   than	   they	   did	   in	   their	   prior	   jobs,	   and	   find	   employment	   within	   26	  weeks	   of	  becoming	  unemployed.	  The	   subsidy	   is	   equal	   to	  50	  percent	  of	   the	  wage	  drop	   for	  up	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Van	  der	  Linden	  (2016)	  11	  Information	  is	  gathered	  from	  labor	  market	  researchers	  in	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Denmark,	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Portugal,	   Spain,	   Sweden,	   Switzerland,	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   from	   the	   OECD	  publication	  series,	  “Back	  to	  work”,	  which	  identifies	  wage	  insurance	  programs	  in	  Canada	  and	  in	  the	  United	  States	   only,	   among	   	   nine	   countries:	   Australia,	   Canada,	   Denmark,	   Finland,	   Japan,	   Korea,	   New	   Zealand,	  Sweden	  and	  the	  United	  States.	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two	   years.	   It	   is	   capped	   at	   $10,000.	   The	   ATAA	   program	   is	   small:	   less	   than	   100,000	  workers	  begin	  receiving	  income	  support	  each	  year.12	  	  In	   Japan,	   the	   “Employment	   Continuation	   Benefits	   for	   Older	   Workers”	   program,	  compensates	   workers	   from	   age	   60	   to	   65	   whose	   wage	   drops	   by	   at	   least	   25%.	   The	  compensation	   goes	   up	   to	   15%	   of	   their	   current	   wage	   until	   they	   reach	   age	   65.	   This	  program	  is	  limited	  in	  size.	  About	  190,000	  workers	  were	  enrolled	  in	  2012.13	  	  	  In	   Germany,	   the	   “Remuneration	   for	   older	   workers”	   program14	  introduced	   in	   2003	   is	  targeted	   at	  workers	   aged	   above	   50.	  Workers	   finding	   a	   new	   job	   paying	   less	   than	   their	  previous	   jobs	   are	   eligible	   for	   a	   compensation	  of	   50%	  of	   the	   earnings	  drop	   in	   the	   first	  year	  and	  30%	   in	   the	  second	  year.	  The	  compensation	   is	  proportional	   to	  hours	  worked.	  For	  instance,	  if	  40	  hours	  per	  week	  were	  worked	  on	  the	  previous	  job	  and	  20	  in	  the	  new	  job,	   the	   earnings	   difference	   was	   computed	   using	   ½	   of	   	   the	   previous	   earnings.	   The	  program	  was	   limited	   in	  size.	   It	  had	   less	   that	  10,000	  participants	  until	  2006	  and	  about	  	  20,000	  	  when	  it	  	  was	  cancelled	  in	  2011.	  	  	  In	  France,	  since	  2011,	  companies	  with	  fewer	  than	  1,000	  employees	  and	  companies	  of	  all	  sizes	  engaged	  in	  reorganization	  or	  liquidation	  proceedings,	  which	  dismiss	  employees	  for	  economic	   reasons,	  must	   offer	   them	   the	   option	   of	   joining	   the	   “Job	   security	   contract”15	  program.	  This	  program	   	   sets	   them	  on	  a	   return-­‐to-­‐work	  path	   including	  support	   for	   the	  professional	   	   goals	   of	   the	   individual,	   as	   well	   as	   training	   and	   work	   periods.	   Workers	  finding	  a	  new	  job	  paying	  less	  than	  their	  previous	  jobs	  are	  eligible	  to	  have	  their	  drop	  in	  earnings	  fully	  offset	  for	  a	  period	  that	  may	  not	  exceed	  12	  months,	  and	  within	  a	  maximum	  amount	   of	   up	   to	   50%	   of	   their	   residual	   rights	   to	   unemployment	   insurance	   benefits.	  Unlike	  the	  US,	  Japanese	  and	  German	  wage	  insurance	  programs,	  the	  French	  job	  security	  contract	   is	   not	   reserved	   for	   the	   elderly.	   Nevertheless,	   its	   size	   remains	   small.	   About	  80,000	   workers	   were	   enrolled	   in	   2016	   and	   most	   of	   them	   were	   involved	   in	   training	  programs.	  	  The	   Earnings	   Supplement	   Project	   implemented	   in	   Canada	   in	   1995-­‐96	   was	   a	  demonstration	  project	   aimed	   at	   testing	   the	   effects	   of	   a	   financial	   incentive	  designed	   to	  stimulate	   the	  re-­‐employment	  of	  displaced	  workers	  and	  repeat	  users	  of	  unemployment	  insurance.16	  The	  program	  offered	  payments	  of	  75	  percent	  of	  the	  earnings	  loss	  for	  up	  to	  two	  years,	  for	  workers	  working	  at	  least	  32	  hours	  per	  week	  within	  26	  weeks	  of	  the	  offer	  date.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Schochet	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	  Wandner	  (2016)	  provide	  extensive	  surveys	  of	  wage	  insurance	  in	  the	  US.	  	  13	  OECD	  (2015),	  p	  120.	  14	  Entgeltsicherung	  für	  ältere	  Arbeitnehmer,	  see	  Steiner	  (2017)	  and	  	  van	  der	  Berg	  et	  al.	  (2017).	  15	  Contrat	  de	  sécurisation	  professionnelle,	  see	  Boum	  Galiana	  et	  al.	  	  (2016).	  16	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  (1999).	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1.3.	  Short-­‐time	  work	  regulations	  	  Also	  called	  short-­‐time	  compensation,	   short-­‐time	  work	   is	  a	  public	  program	   intended	   to	  preserve	   jobs	   in	   firms	   experiencing	   temporarily	   low	   revenue	   by	   providing	   income	  support	   to	   employees	   whose	   hours	   of	   work	   are	   reduced.	   Short-­‐time	   work	   schemes	  provide	   additional	   funds	   so	   that	   employees	   can	   reduce	   their	   hours	   of	  work	  without	   a	  proportional	  reduction	  in	  their	  take-­‐home	  pay.	  In	  general,	  the	  employees	  earn	  less	  than	  they	   do	   when	   they	   work	   usual	   hours,	   but	   more	   than	   they	   would	   receive	   in	  unemployment	  benefits.	  The	  cost	  of	   supplementing	   the	  employee’s	   income	   is	   typically	  shared	  by	  the	  employer	  and	  the	  state.	  	  	  
	  	  
The	  design	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  schemes	  	  	  The	  design	  and	  regulation	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  schemes	  vary	  greatly	  across	  countries.17	  	  	  	  Firms	  are	  usually	   required	   to	  meet	  a	  number	  of	   eligibility	   criteria	   to	  enter	   into	   short-­‐time	  work	  arrangements.	  These	  criteria	  include	  evidence	  of	  slowdown	  in	  their	  economic	  activity,	  the	  existence	  of	  collective	  agreements	  which	  allow	  take-­‐up	  of	  short-­‐time	  work,	  and	   consultation	   with	   employees	   or	   individual	   agreements.	   In	   some	   countries,	   only	  workers	   eligible	   for	   unemployment	   insurance	   benefits	   can	   take	   up	   short-­‐time	   work	  compensation.	  	  Short-­‐time	   work	   schemes	   are	   often	   conditional	   on	   actions	   to	   be	   taken	   by	   firms	   or	  employees.	  These	  include	  the	  commitment	  not	  to	  dismiss	  employees	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  after	   short-­‐time	   work	   compensation	   comes	   to	   an	   end,	   job	   search	   requirements,	   the	  design	  of	  a	  recovery	  plan,	  and	  training	  of	  employees.	  	  Working-­‐time	   reduction	   can	   be	   either	   total	   or	   partial,	   depending	   on	   the	   size	   of	   the	  economic	   slowdown.	   A	   maximum	   duration	   of	   compensation	   prevails	   in	   all	   countries,	  notably	   because	   short-­‐time	   work	   must	   be	   temporary	   by	   nature.	   In	   most	   countries,	  income	  falls	  progressively	  as	  hours	  fall	  further	  below	  their	  usual	  level.	  In	  a	  majority	  of	  countries,	   employers	   bear	   a	   share	   of	   the	   total	   cost	   of	   compensation	   for	   each	   reduced	  hour.	  This	  is	  a	  way	  to	  incentivize	  firms	  and	  employees	  not	  to	  abuse	  the	  system.	  	  	  
The	  coverage	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  	  The	  fraction	  of	  the	  labor	  force	  using	  short-­‐time	  work	  under	  normal	  circumstances	  is	  low	  in	  most	  OECD	   countries.	   Table	   1	   shows	   that	   this	   fraction	   varies	   in	   2015	   from	   zero	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Hijzen	  and	  Venn,	  (2010),	  Cahuc	  and	  Carcillo,	  (2011).	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many	  countries	  to	  2.5%	  in	  Belgium,	  which	  is	  an	  outlier.	  This	  low	  coverage	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  low	  share	  of	  public	  expenditure,	  which	  varies	  from	  zero	  to	  0.28%	  of	  GDP.	  	  	  	  Short-­‐time	   work	   use	   is	   countercyclical.	   In	   most	   countries	   where	   short-­‐time	   work	  schemes	   existed	  prior	   to	   the	   last	   great	   recession	   (see	  Table	  2),	   participation	   in	   short-­‐time	  work	  arrangements	  increased	  	  dramatically	  during	  the	  recession.	  In	  2009,	  take-­‐up	  rates	   were	   above	   1%	   of	   the	   labor	   force	   in	   Belgium,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   Luxembourg,	  Slovenia	  and	  Switzerland	  (Figure	  4).	  The	  countries	  of	  Northern	  Europe	  (except	  Finland)	  either	  exhibit	  low	  take-­‐up	  rates	  (such	  as	  Denmark	  and	  Norway,	  below	  1%),	  or	  no	  short-­‐time	  work	  scheme	  at	  all	  (such	  as	  Iceland	  and	  Sweden)	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  pattern	  is	  similar	   in	   English-­‐speaking	   countries	   (except	   Ireland),	   with	   take-­‐up	   below	   0.2%	   in	  Canada,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  U.S.	  (no	  scheme	  in	  Australia	  and	  the	  U.K).	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Table	  2	  :	  Short-­‐time	  work	  (STW)	  compensation	  schemes	  in	  19	  OECD	  countries	  before	  and	  during	  the	  2008-­‐
2009	  recession.	  Source:	  Hizjen	  and	  Venn	  (2011)	  
Country	   Existence	  of	  Short-­‐time	  work	  Austria	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Belgium	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Czech	  Republic	   Introduced	  during	  the	  crisis	  Denmark	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Finland	   Existed	  before	  2008	  France	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Germany	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Greece	   No	  STW	  Hungary	   Introduced	  during	  the	  crisis	  Italy	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Japan	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Netherlands	   Introduced	  during	  the	  crisis	  Norway	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Poland	   Introduced	  during	  the	  crisis	  Portugal	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Slovak	  Republic	   Introduced	  during	  the	  crisis	  Spain	   Existed	  before	  2008	  Sweden	   No	  Short-­‐time	  work	  United	  Kingdom	   No	  Short-­‐time	  work	  
	  
	  
	  The	  dispersion	  of	  take-­‐up	  across	  countries	  is	  clearly	  related	  to	  differences	  in	  short-­‐time	  work	  schemes.18	  The	  take-­‐up	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  permissible	  reductions	  in	  weekly	   working	   hours	   that	   can	   be	   compensated,	   with	   the	   maximum	   duration	   of	   the	  scheme	   and	   with	   the	   share	   of	   labor	   cost	   of	   reduced	   hours	   which	   is	   subsidized.	  	  Surprisingly,	   take-­‐up	   rates	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   related	   to	   such	   stringencies	   in	   the	  conditions	  required	  to	  benefit	  from	  short-­‐time	  compensation	  as	  the	  commitment	  to	  not	  dismiss	  employees	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  after	  the	  end	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  compensation,	  the	  job	  search	  requirements,	  the	  design	  of	  a	  recovery	  plan,	  or	  the	  training	  of	  employees.	  It	   might	   be	   that	   these	   conditions	   do	   not	   play	   an	   important	   role	   because	   their	  enforcement	  is	  difficult.	  	  	  Short-­‐time	   work	   schemes	   also	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   developed	   in	   countries	   with	   stricter	  employment	  protection	  rules,	  measured	  by	  the	  OECD	  employment	  protection	  indicator,	  notably	   in	   Belgium,	   Germany,	   Italy	   and	   Luxemburg.	  19	  This	   positive	   relation	   between	  short-­‐time	  work	  and	  job	  protection	  reflects	  a	  trade-­‐off	   in	  regulations	  affecting	  internal	  and	   external	   flexibility.	   Countries	   which	   favor	   internal	   flexibility	   combine	   stringent	  employment	   protection	   regulations	   and	   generous	   short-­‐time	   work	   schemes	   while	  external	  flexibility	  is	  associated	  with	  weak	  employment	  protection	  and	  no	  or	  very	  little	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Hijzen	  and	  Venn	  (2011),	  Cahuc	  and	  Carcillo	  (2011).	  19	  Hijzen	  and	  Venn	  (2011),	  Cahuc	  and	  Carcillo	  (2011).	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short-­‐time	  work	  use.	  At	  first	  sight,	  internal	  flexibility	  might	  seem	  preferable,	  insofar	  as	  it	  reduces	  job	  destruction	  during	  recessions.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  internal	   flexibility	   also	  has	  disadvantages.	   First,	   internal	   flexibility	  does	  not	  benefit	   all	  workers.	  It	  is	  clearly	  beneficial	  to	  workers	  in	  permanent	  jobs,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  detrimental	  to	   outsiders,	   whose	   access	   to	   employment	   can	   be	   more	   difficult	   if	   short-­‐time	   work	  reduces	   job	  turnover.	  This	  disadvantage	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  is	  potentially	   important	   in	  strongly	   segmented	   labor	   markets.	   Second,	   short-­‐time	   work	   may	   dampen	   the	  reallocation	  of	  workers	  	  towards	  more	  productive	  jobs.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  4	  :	  Short time work  take-up rates in the OECD countries 2000-2015 as share of the labor force for 
countries with positive take-up at least once over 2010-2015. 	  	  	  
2.	   The	   economics	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance,	   wage	   insurance	   and	  
short-­‐time	  work	  	  This	   section	   presents	   the	   theoretical	   results	   of	   the	   economic	   literature	   on	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance,	  wage	  insurance	  and	  short-­‐time	  work.	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employment	   and	   production	   and	   to	   reduce	   the	   cost	   of	   unemployment	   insurance.	  Nevertheless,	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance	   can	   lock	   workers	   into	   part-­‐time	   or	  temporary	  jobs,	  thereby	  reducing	  the	  total	  number	  of	  hours	  worked.	  	  
	  
	  
The	  potential	  effects	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  	  Part-­‐time	  unemployment	   insurance	  supplies	   incentives	  to	   job	  seekers	  who	  are	   looking	  for	  stable	  full-­‐time	  jobs	  to	  accept	  part-­‐time	  jobs	  or	  short	  full-­‐time	  jobs	  in	  the	  mean	  time.	  	  	  Accepting	   part-­‐time	   or	   short	   full-­‐time	   jobs	   can	   have	   several	   advantages.	   Non-­‐regular	  jobs	  can	  favor	  access	  to	  regular	  and	  more	  stable	  jobs	  if	  employers	  use	  non-­‐regular	  jobs	  to	  screen	  workers.20	  Accessing	  non-­‐regular	   jobs	  can	  allow	  workers	  to	  enlarge	  their	   job	  search	  network.	  Working	  instead	  of	  remaining	  on	  the	  dole	  maintains	  existing	  skills	  and	  enables	   the	   acquisition	   of	   valuable	   new	   skills	   which	   raise	   the	   individual’s	   ability	   to	  compete	   for	   regular	   jobs.	   Finally,	   while	   working	   on	   non-­‐regular	   jobs,	   unemployed	  workers	  generally	  pay	  taxes	  and	  get	  lower	  unemployment	  benefits	  and	  social	  transfers,	  which	  improves	  public	  finances.	  	  	  Promoting	   non-­‐regular	   jobs	  may	   also	   have	   disadvantages.	  Many	   people	  who	  work	   on	  non-­‐regular	  jobs	  would	  like	  to	  get	  regular	  jobs.	  But	  significant	  shares	  of	  workers	  on	  non-­‐regular	  jobs	  do	  not	  want	  to	  work	  more	  hours.	  Therefore,	  the	  promotion	  of	  non-­‐regular	  employment	  may	  be	  detrimental	  to	  regular	  employment.21	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  if	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  provide	  income	  for	  non-­‐regular	  employment	  at	  levels	  close	   to	   that	  of	   regular	  employment	   for	   long	  periods	  of	   time.	   In	   that	  case,	  non-­‐regular	  employment	  can	  become	  attractive	  as	  it	  allows	  individuals	  to	  get	  an	  income	  close	  to	  that	  of	   full-­‐time	   workers	   while	   working	   fewer	   hours.	   The	   development	   of	   non-­‐regular	  employment	  at	  the	  expenses	  of	  regular	  employment	  has	  many	  negative	  effects.	  It	  raises	  income	   uncertainty,	   it	   reduces	   the	   incentives	   to	   invest	   in	   human	   capital,	   it	   impedes	  career	   prospects	   and	   long-­‐term	   earning	   opportunities,	   it	   reduces	   the	   ability	   to	   obtain	  credit,	  it	  makes	  child	  care	  arrangements	  more	  complicated	  and	  it	  degrades	  the	  state	  of	  public	  finances.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  
The	  design	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  	  	  Economic	   analysis	   provides	   limited	   guidance	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   optimal	   design	   of	  part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance.	   The	   canonical	   analysis	   of	   optimal	   unemployment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Neugart	  and	  Storrie,	  (2002);	  Houseman	  et	  al.,	  (2003).	  21	  Eck	  and	  Holmlund	  (2015).	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insurance	  overlooks	  the	  choice	  of	  number	  of	  hours	  of	  work	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment.22	  It	  assumes	  that	  individuals	  can	  be	  in	  only	  two	  states:	  either	  full-­‐time	   unemployed	   or	   full-­‐time	   employed.	   In	   this	   framework,	   the	   optimal	   level	   of	  unemployment	  benefits	  increases	  with	  risk	  aversion	  and	  decreases	  with	  the	  elasticity	  of	  unemployment	  duration	  with	  respect	  to	  unemployment	  benefits.	  Introducing	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  in	  this	  framework	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  conceptual	  task.	  One	  needs	  to	  account	  for	  labor	  supply	  at	  the	  extensive	  (working	  or	  not	  working)	  and	  at	  the	  intensive	  margin	   (choice	   of	   the	  number	  of	   hours	  worked	   conditional	   on	  working)	   in	   a	   dynamic	  and	   stochastic	   context.	   This	   type	   of	   problem	   has	   been	   studied	   by	   the	   literature	   on	  optimal	   taxation	   and	   optimal	   insurance.	   This	   literature	   shows	   that	   it	   is	   essential	   to	  coordinate	   the	   tax	   system	  with	  unemployment	   insurance.	   It	   suggests	   that	   the	   optimal	  level	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefit	  should	  depend	  on	  the	  inter-­‐temporal	  elasticity	  of	   labor	   supply	   and	   on	   labor	   market	   frictions	   which	   limit	   the	   adjustment	   of	   hours	  worked.23 	  Beyond	   these	   results,	   no	   simple	   conclusion	   providing	   clear	   guidance	   to	  designing	  optimal	  partial	  unemployment	  insurance	  has	  emerged	  so	  far.	  Much	  remains	  to	  be	  done	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  contribution	  of	  Le	  Barbanchon	  (2017),	  	  focusing	  on	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  is	  particularly	  interesting.	  	  In	  the	  United	  States	   systems	   analyzed	   by	   Le	   Barbanchon,	   insurance	   recipients	   accepting	   part-­‐time	  jobs	  can	  earn	  up	  to	  a	  specific	  amount,	  the	  “disregard”	  mentioned	  	  above	  (see	  Figure	  2),	  with	   no	   reduction	   in	   benefits.	   For	   every	   dollar	   earned	   above	   the	   disregard,	   current	  benefits	  are	  reduced	  on	  a	  dollar-­‐per-­‐dollar	  basis:	   the	  static	  marginal	  benefit-­‐reduction	  rate	  is	  100%.	  However,	  the	  reduction	  in	  benefits	  is	  not	  lost,	  it	  can	  be	  paid	  in	  a	  later	  week.	  The	   corresponding	   benefit	   transfer	   delays	   the	   potential	   benefit	   exhaustion	   date.	  Accordingly,	   forward-­‐looking	   recipients	  make	   decisions	   based	   on	   a	   dynamic	  marginal	  tax	  rate,	  which	   is	   lower	  than	  the	  static	  benefit-­‐reduction	  rate.	  Le	  Barbanchon	  analyzes	  the	   consequences	   of	   changes	   in	   the	   benefit-­‐reduction	   rate.	   He	   finds	   that	   setting	   the	  benefit-­‐reduction	  rate	  at	  80%	  instead	  of	  100%	  would	  be	  welfare-­‐improving.	  Moreover,	  he	   shows	   that	   the	  optimal	  benefit-­‐reduction	   rate	   should	  vary	  over	   the	  unemployment	  spell	  and	  should	  depend	  on	  the	  arrival	  rate	  of	  job	  offers.	  	  	  	  
2.2.	  Wage	  insurance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Wage	  insurance	  aims	  to	  compensate	  displaced	  workers	  for	  wage	  losses.	  It	  has	  pros	  and	  cons.	   Its	  proponents	  argue	  that	   it	   improves	   labor	  market	  equity	   for	  workers	  adversely	  affected	  by	  economic	  restructuring.	  They	  also	  argue	  that	  wage	  insurance	  would	  reduce	  the	   periods	   of	   unemployment	   and	   increase	   employment	   and	   earnings.	   Its	   opponents	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Baily	  (1978),	  Chetty	  (2006).	  23	  Fahri	  and	  Werning	  (2013),	  Werquin,	  (2016).	  
	   21	  
question	  its	  equity	  and	  raise	  concerns	  about	  its	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  career	  prospects	  of	  recipients	  of	  	  wage	  insurance.	  	  	  
Equitable	  sharing	  of	  the	  gains	  from	  jobs	  reallocation	  
	  A	   substantial	   body	   of	   empirical	   contributions	   has	   shown	   that	   long-­‐tenured	   displaced	  workers	   face	   significant	   and	   persistent	   problems,	   including	   unemployment,	   earning	  losses,	  	  and	  health	  problems,	  which	  affect	  not	  only	  themselves,	  but	  also	  their	  children.24	  	  Wage	  insurance	  can	  help	  in	  solving	  these	  problems	  insofar	  as	  it	  compensates	  individuals	  affected	  by	   	  significant	  persistent	  negative	  shocks.	  By	  smoothing	  the	  social	  costs	  of	   job	  reallocation,	   wage	   insurance	   can	   help	   improve	   the	   level	   of	   public	   support	   for	  international	   trade,	   and	  more	  widely,	  public	  acceptance	  of	   technological	   changes.	  This	  idea	   was	   an	   important	   motivation	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   wage	   insurance	   in	   the	  United	   States	   at	   a	   time	   of	   great	   fear	   of	   the	   adverse	   impact	   of	   international	   trade	   on	  American	  jobs.25	  	  	  Although	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	   wage	   insurance	   can	   compensate	   long-­‐tenured	   displaced	  workers,	   the	   question	   is	   whether	   these	   long-­‐tenured	   workers	   should	   benefit	   from	  special	   treatment.	   Empirical	   studies	   show	   that	   cross-­‐worker	   wage	   differentials	   are	  explained	   by	   characteristics	   of	   workers	   and	   firms.	   The	   importance	   of	   labor	   market	  frictions	   implies	   that	   the	   firm	   fixed	   effects	   explain	   a	   significant	   share	   of	   the	   wage	  distribution,	  meaning	   that	  workers	   identically	  motivated	   and	   productive	   can	   be	   	   paid	  very	  	  differently.26	  In	  this	  context,	  lucky	  workers	  	  are	  	  matched	  with	  successful	  firms,	  in	  	  which	   they	  can	  win	   long	  and	  satisfying	  career	  paths.	  Less	   lucky	   	  workers	   find	   	   jobs	   in	  	  less	   successful	   firms.	   These	   jobs	   offer	   lower	   wages	   and	   are	   less	   stable.	   From	   this	  perspective,	  compensation	   for	   the	  wage	   losses	  of	   long-­‐tenured	  displaced	  workers	  may	  do	  no	  more	  than	  help	  to	  reproduce	  and	  prolong	  the	  inequality	  between	  those	  workers	  who	  have	  been	   lucky	  at	   the	   start	  of	   their	   career,	   and	   those	  who	  have	  been	   less	   lucky.	  	  Designing	  an	  equitable	  insurance	  system	  requires	  precise	  information	  about	  the	  process	  that	  governs	  wage	  dynamics	  over	   the	   life	   cycle	  of	   all	  workers,	   and	  not	   just	   those	  who	  lose	   their	   job	   after	   a	   long	   career	   in	   the	   same	   firm.	   In	   the	   current	   state	   of	   knowledge,	  there	  is	  no	  strong	  	  argument	  on	  grounds	  of	  equity	  in	  favor	  of	  compensating	  long	  tenured	  workers	  specifically	  for	  wage	  losses.	  	  	  A	   related	   	   issue	   concerns	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   beneficiaries	   of	   wage	   insurance.	   For	  	  instance,	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   only	   earning	   losses	   related	   to	   international	   trade	   are	  offset,	  while	   those	   induced	  by	   technological	  shocks	  are	  not.	  This	  creates	  differences	  of	  	  treatment	  that	  are	  also	  difficult	  to	  justify	  on	  equity	  grounds.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Oreopoulos	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  25	  Wandner	  	  (2016).	  	  26	  Abowd	  et	  al	  (2013),	  Song	  et	  al	  (2016).	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Incentive	  for	  reemployment	  	  An	   important	   argument	   in	   favor	   of	   wage	   insurance	   is	   that	   it	   provides	   incentives	   for	  finding	   jobs.	   The	   literature	   on	  optimal	   unemployment	   insurance	  does	   suggest	   that	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   can	   be	   desirable. 27 	  This	   literature	   analyzes	   the	   optimal	   profile	   of	  unemployment	   benefits	   over	   a	   course	   of	   unemployment	   spells	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   in-­‐work	   	   benefits.	   It	   shows,	   in	   a	   simple	   framework	   	   where	   	   individuals	   can	   be	   either	  unemployed	  or	  employed	  in	  regular	  jobs,	  that	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  can	  be	  desirable	  because	  they	  supply	  incentives	  to	  look	  for	  and	  to	  accept	  job	  offers.	   	  The	  use	  of	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  may	   allow	   the	   unemployment	   insurance	   system	   to	   set	   more	   generous	   benefits	   over	  longer	  spells	  in	  optimal	  fashion	  and	  to	  improve	  the	  welfare	  of	  workers.	  	  	  However,	   in	  the	  real	  world,	  the	  design	  of	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  in	  unemployment	  insurance	  systems	   has	   to	   depend	   on	   many	   parameters,	   which	   implies	   that	   they	   are	   difficult	   to	  implement.	   In	   particular,	   optimal	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   should	   be	   temporary	   to	   avoid	  excessive	   costs	   and	   lock-­‐in	   effects	   in	   low-­‐productivity	   subsidized	   jobs.	   But	   if	   in-­‐work	  benefits	  are	  temporary,	  workers	  may	  have	  incentives	  to	  go	  back	  to	  unemployment	  once	  they	   stop	   getting	   them.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   time-­‐limited	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   are	   fully	  justified	   if	   they	  do	  function	  as	  stepping	  stones	  toward	  stable	  employment.	  We	  will	  see	  that	   empirical	   evidence	   provides	   very	   little	   support	   for	   this	   	   assumption.	   	   For	   these	  reasons,	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   are	   seldom	   used	   in	   unemployment	   insurance	   systems	   and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assess	  the	  situation	  of	  recipients	  of	  wage	  insurance	  differently	  from	  that	   of	   other	   unemployed	   workers.	   This	   means	   that	   there	   are	   no	   strong	   arguments	  justifying	  wage	  insurance	  by	  its	  positive	  impact	  on	  reemployment.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Job	  quality	  and	  career	  prospects	  
	  	  Wage	   insurance	  can	   induce	  workers	   to	  accept	   low	  quality	   jobs	  and	   to	   remain	   in	   these	  jobs	  as	  long	  they	  are	  getting	  compensated	  for	  their	  wage	  loss.	  Hence	  wage	  insurance	  can	  create	   disincentives	   to	   building	   human	   capital	   and	   looking	   for	   better	   jobs.	   This	   is	  detrimental	  to	  the	  career	  path	  of	  wage	  insurance	  recipients	  and	  to	  the	  overall	  efficiency	  of	   the	   labor	   market.28	  But	   these	   disadvantages	   may	   be	   mitigated	   by	   monitoring	   and	  training	   programs	   provided	   to	   wage	   insurance	   recipients.	   Actually,	   there	   	   are	  complementarities	   between	   financial	   incentives	   to	   finding	   jobs,	   and	   training	   and	  monitoring	   programs.	   In	   any	   	   case,	   this	   suggests	   that	  wage	   insurance	   should	   not	   	   be	  isolated	   from	   other	   active	   labor	   market	   policies.	   The	   French	   “Job	   security	   contract”	  program,	   	  which	  includes	  training,	   job	  search	  counseling	  and	  monitoring	  together	  with	  compensation	  for	  earnings	  drops,	  relies	  on	  such	  premises.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Hopenhayn	  and	  Nicolini	  (2997,	  2009).	  28	  Michau	  (2017)	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By	  reducing	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  returns	  on	  investment	  in	  human	  capital,	  wage	  insurance	  can	   also	   have	   direct	   positive	   effects	   on	   human	   capital	   accumulation.	   If	   access	   to	  potentially	   long-­‐tenured	   jobs	   requires	   employees	   to	   make	   important	   investments	   in	  specific	  human	  capital	  that	  cannot	  be	  valorized	  in	  other	  jobs,	  there	  can	  be	  room	  for	  wage	  insurance	   for	   long-­‐tenured	   displaced	   workers.	   However,	   insofar	   as	   employees	   have	  limited	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  specific	  human	  capital,29	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  wage	  insurance	  in	  this	  area	  is	  limited.	  	  	  	  All	   in	  all,	  the	  most	  solid	   	   justification	  of	  wage	  insurance	  relies	  on	  its	  potential	   	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  reemployment	  prospects	  of	  long-­‐tenured	  displaced	  workers.	  Determining	  whether	   compensation	   for	   the	  wage	   losses	  of	   long-­‐tenured	  displaced	  workers	  does	   in	  fact	  yield	  strong	  incentives	  to	  find	  jobs	  is	  an	  empirical	  issue	  that	  	  will	  be	  surveyed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  	  
2.3.	  Short-­‐time	  work	  	  The	  rationale	  for	  short-­‐time	  work	  is	  that	  firms	  may	  dismiss	  workers	   inefficiently	  when	  their	  revenue	  drops.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  can	  be	  appropriate	  to	  use	  short-­‐time	  work	  to	   allow	   firms	   facing	   temporary	   drops	   in	   their	   activity	   to	   retain	   their	   employees.	  However,	  short-­‐time	  work	  may	  also	  induce	  inefficient	  reductions	  in	  hours	  worked	  and	  may	  prevent	  the	  reallocation	  of	  labor	  toward	  more	  productive	  firms.	  	  	  
Reducing	  layoffs	  	  The	   introduction	   of	   short-­‐time	  work	   arrangements	   is	   often	   seen	   as	   a	  means	   to	   avoid	  drastic	  layoffs.30	  	  In	  general,	  employers	  have	  limited	  incentives	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  social	  costs	  of	   their	  dismissal	  decisions.	  These	  social	  costs	  are	  numerous:	   they	   include	  the	  unemployment	  benefits,	   the	   social	   transfers	  paid	   to	  unemployed	  workers,	   and	   the	  drop	   in	   taxes	   and	   social	   contributions	   induced	   by	   the	   removal	   of	   their	   jobs.	   To	   these	  costs	   we	   may	   add	   the	   increase	   in	   health	   expenditure	   and	   the	   rise	   in	   criminality31	  induced	  by	  unemployment.	  	  	  Experience-­‐rating	   systems,	   where	   employers’	   social	   contributions	   depend	   on	   the	  induced	   social	   costs	   of	   their	   firing	   decisions,	   can	   be	   used	   to	   reduce	   excess	   layoffs.32	  These	   inefficient	   layoffs	   can	   be	   completely	   eliminated	   when	   there	   is	   full	   experience-­‐rating,	   i.e.	   when	   each	   firm	   fully	   covers	   the	   induced	   social	   cost	   of	   its	   firing	   decisions.	  However,	   there	  are	   limits	   to	  experience-­‐rating.	  Notably,	  many	   firms	  may	   face	   financial	  constraints	  which	  can	  prevent	  them	  from	  keeping	  their	  employees	  even	  if	  the	  system	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Becker	  (1964),	  Acemoglu	  and	  	  Pischke	  (1999).	  30	  Fitzroy	  and	  Hart	  (1985),	  Burdett	  and	  Wright	  (1989).	  31	  Fougère	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  32	  Feldstein	  (1976),	  Blanchard	  and	  Tirole	  (2007),	  Cahuc	  and	  Zylberberg	  (2008),	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fully	  experience-­‐rated.	  Recent	  evidence	  on	  employment	  adjustment	  during	  the	  last	  great	  recession	   in	   the	   US	   shows	   that	  more	   highly	   leveraged	   firms	   experienced	   significantly	  larger	   employment	   losses	   in	   response	   to	   declines	   in	   local	   demand.33	  These	   highly	  leveraged	  firms	  were	  not	  less	  productive.	  Nevertheless,	  their	  high	  leverage	  implied	  that	  they	  were	  less	  able	  to	  raise	  additional	  short	  and	  long-­‐term	  debt	  in	  response	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  local	  demand.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  they	  experienced	  more	  layoffs	  and	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  close	  down.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  full	  experience-­‐rating	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  fully	  efficient.	  In	  these	   circumstances,	   short-­‐time	   work	   arrangements	   may	   avoid	   inefficient	   job	  destructions	  due	  to	  capital	  market	  imperfections.34	  	  Short-­‐time	  work	  may	  also	  be	  an	  effective	  means	  to	  subsidize	  employment	  compared	  to	  other	  policies	  like	  wage	  or	  hiring	  subsidies,	  the	  reason	  being	  that,	  in	  contrast	  to	  wage	  or	  hiring	   subsidies,	   short-­‐time	   work	   can	   directly	   target	   those	   firms	   with	   jobs	   at	   risk	   of	  being	  destroyed,	  and	  even	  more	  precisely	  the	  most	  fragile	  jobs	  within	  those	  firms.	  Other	  policies	  have	  no	  such	  possibility.	  To	  put	  it	  differently,	  because	  	  it	  is	  more	  profitable	  for	  firms	   to	   reduce	   the	   hours	  worked	   of	   temporarily	   low-­‐productive	  workers,	   short-­‐time	  work	  induces	  firms	  to	  target	  (i.e.	  retain)	  	  low-­‐productivity	  jobs	  that	  may	  need	  financial	  support	  to	  survive	  during	  recessions	  much	  more	  precisely	  than	  most	  other	  policies	  such	  as	   wage	   or	   hiring	   subsidies.	   Hence,	   short-­‐time	  work	   can	   help	   sustain	   employment	   in	  recessions	  at	  a	  small	  cost,	  relative	  to	  other	  policies	  providing	  financial	  supports	  to	  firms.	  	  	  It	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  short-­‐time	  work	  is	  more	  equitable	  because	  it	  distributes	  the	  adjustment	  burden	  of	  hours	  of	  work	  over	  a	  large	  number	  of	  workers,	  who	  reduce	  their	  hours	  of	  work,	  compared	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  some	  workers	  are	  dismissed	  outright.35	  	  	  	  
Limits	  to	  short-­‐time	  work	  	  Although	  short-­‐time	  work	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  avoid	  inefficient	  job	  destructions,	  it	  also	  has	  some	  disadvantages.	  	  	  First,	  short-­‐time	  work	  distorts	  downwards	  the	  number	  of	  hours	  worked	  per	  employee.	  This	   is	  hardly	  surprising	  insofar	  as	  short-­‐time	  work	  is	  a	  subsidy	  to	  non-­‐worked	  hours.	  This	  implies	  that	  short-­‐time	  work	  may	  be	  used	  to	  reduce	  the	  hours	  of	  work	  of	  workers	  who	  would	  not	  have	  not	  been	  dismissed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  short-­‐time	  work	  option.	  In	  this	   case,	   short-­‐time	   work	   induces	   inefficient	   reductions	   in	   hours	   worked.	   This	  phenomenon	   can	   be	   particularly	   important	   if	   short-­‐time	  work	   is	   strongly	   subsidized,	  meaning	   that	   non-­‐worked	   hours	   impose	   little	   cost	   on	   employers.	   In	   such	   situations,	  there	  are	  strong	  incentives	  to	  use	  short-­‐time	  work	  when	  the	  firm’s	  activity	  slows	  down.	  This	   can	   lead	   to	   recurrent	   use	   of	   short-­‐time	   work	   by	   firms	   facing	   seasonal	   activity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Giroud	  and	  Mueller	  (2017).	  34	  Burdett	  and	  Wright	  (1989)	  35	  Abraham	  and	  Houseman,	  (1994),	  Walsh	  et	  al.,	  (1997);	  Vroman	  and	  Brusentev,	  (2009)	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fluctuations. 36 	  These	   firms	   benefit	   from	   cross-­‐subsidies,	   which	   reduce	   aggregate	  production.	   To	   limit	   these	   cross-­‐subsidies,	   it	   is	   desirable	   to	   rely	   on	   experience	   rated	  systems,	   where	   employers	   have	   to	   pay	   back	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   short-­‐time	   work	   cost	  through	  higher	  social	  contributions	  in	  the	  future.	  This	  system	  allows	  firms	  facing	  short-­‐term	   financial	   constraints	   to	   sustain	   employment	   without	   inducing	   cross-­‐subsidies	  which	  reduce	  aggregate	  production.	  	  	  Second,	   short-­‐time	   work	   may	   dampen	   the	   reallocation	   of	   jobs	   toward	   the	   most	  productive	  firms.	  Inasmuch	  as	  short-­‐time	  work	  causes	  fewer	  workers	  to	  be	  released	  into	  the	   unemployment	   pool	   from	   incumbent	   firms,	   new	   firms	   find	   it	   more	   costly	   to	   hire	  labor.	  In	  this	  context,	  short-­‐time	  work	  may	  prevent	  labor	  from	  flowing	  towards	  the	  most	  productive	  firms,	  and	  generate	  adverse	  effects	  on	  global	  production.37	  	  	  Third,	   as	   short-­‐time	  work	  mostly	   benefits	   permanent	  workers,	   it	   may	   accentuate	   the	  labor	   market	   segmentation	   between	   stable	   and	   unstable	   jobs.	   The	   complementarity	  between	   short-­‐time	  work	   arrangements	   and	   the	   stringency	  of	   employment	  protection	  legislation	   across	   OECD	   countries	   suggests	   that	   this	   phenomenon	   is	   potentially	  important.	   	   Indeed,	   empirical	   research38	  finds	   that	   short	   time	   work	   saves	   permanent	  jobs	  but	  has	  no	  effects	  on	  temporary	  jobs.	  	  	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  lessons	  of	  economic	  analysis	  are	  quite	  clear:	  there	  are	  strong	  arguments	  for	  using	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits,	   short-­‐time	   work	   arrangements	   and	   wage	  insurance	   to	   insure	   workers	   against	   career	   disruptions.	   But	   these	   schemes	   are	   not	  panaceas:	  they	  all	  have	  disadvantages	  which	  can	  make	  them	  non-­‐desirable.	  	  Finally,	  the	  relative	   weight	   of	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   of	   these	   schemes	   depends	   on	   the	  behavior	  of	   	  workers	  and	  firms.	  This	  is	  an	  empirical	   issue	  which	  is	  covered	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.	  The	  empirics	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance,	  wage	  insurance	  and	  short-­‐
time	  work	  	  	  
3.1.	  The	  empirics	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  	  
	  The	   main	   issue	   addressed	   by	   the	   empirical	   literature	   on	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	  insurance	   is	   the	   impact	   of	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   benefits	   on	   access	   to	   non-­‐regular	  and	  regular	  employment.	  This	   literature	   faces	   important	  difficulties	   	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  exhibiting	   causal	   effects,	   insofar	   as	   non-­‐observable	   differences	   between	   full-­‐time	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Cahuc	  and	  Nevoux	  (2017).	  37	  Cooper,	  Meyer	  and	  Schott	  (2017).	  38	  Hizjen	  and	  Martin	  (2013).	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part-­‐time	   unemployed	  workers	   are	   likely	   correlated	  with	   the	   possibilities	   individuals	  have	  to	  access	  regular	  jobs.	  In	  particular,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  people	  with	  identical	  observable	  characteristics	   who	   access	   non-­‐regular	   jobs	   more	   easily	   also	   have	   easier	   access	   to	  regular	   jobs.	   Therefore,	   if	   it	   turns	   out	   that	   recipients	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	  benefits	   do	   find	   regular	   jobs	   faster	   than	   full-­‐time	   unemployed	  workers,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   do	   per	   se	   foster	   accession	   to	   regular	  employment.	   Ideally,	   to	   deal	  with	   this	   selection	   issue,	   researchers	   need	   to	   compare	   a	  treated	   group,	   which	   benefits	   from	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits,	   to	   a	   control	  group,	  which	   is	   not	   entitled	   to	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   benefits.	   Individuals	  must	   be	  randomly	   allocated	   into	   these	   two	   groups	   in	   sufficient	   number	   to	   be	   able	   to	   detect	   a	  causal	   impact	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits.	   Hitherto,	   no	   such	   randomized	  controlled	  trial	  has	  been	  implemented	  to	  identify	  the	  impact	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance.	   Available	   studies	   rely	   on	   different	   empirical	   approaches	   to	   deal	   with	   the	  selection	  issue.	  	  	  	  
United-­‐States	  
	  A	   seminal	   contribution39	  exploits	   variations	   in	   the	   design	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	  benefits	   across	   U.S.	   states	   from	   1986	   to	   1992.	   In	   most	   U.S.	   states,	   unemployment	  insurance	   recipients	   accepting	   part-­‐time	   jobs	   can	   earn	   income	   up	   to	   the	   level	   of	   the	  disregard,	   with	   no	   reduction	   in	   benefits.	   Above	   the	   disregard,	   current	   benefits	   are	  generally	   reduced	   on	   a	   dollar-­‐per-­‐dollar	   basis.	   The	   disregard	   varies	   across	   states	   and	  within	   states	   over	   time.	   A	   10%	   increase	   in	   the	   disregard	   is	   estimated	   to	   raise	   the	  probability	   of	   part-­‐time	   re-­‐employment	   for	  UI	   recipients	   from	  3.9	   to	   5.7%	   in	   the	   first	  three	  months	  of	  unemployment.	  Moreover,	  a	  10%	  increase	  in	  the	  disregard	  is	  found	  to	  reduce	   expected	   joblessness	   durations	   by	   an	   amount	   ranging	   from	   0.3	   to	   0.9%.	   A	  complementary	  contribution40	  finds	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  are	  heterogeneous	  across	  demographic	  groups.	  An	  increase	  in	  the	  disregard	  is	  found	  to	  significantly	   raise	   the	   probability	   of	   part-­‐time	   re-­‐employment	   for	   blue-­‐collar	   youth	  during	  the	   first	   three	  months	  of	   joblessness.	  However,	  no	  significant	   impact	  on	  the	  re-­‐employment	  behavior	  of	  white-­‐collar	  youth	  is	  detected.	  	  	  	  It	   has	   also	   been	   shown	   that	   the	   design	   of	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance	   has	   a	  significant	   impact	   on	   the	   behavior	   of	   unemployed	   workers. 41 	  It	   is	   clear	   that	  unemployment	   benefits	   recipients	   bunch	   at	   the	   disregard,	   meaning	   that	   they	   avoid	  working	   hours	   for	  which	   their	   earnings	   are	   offset	   by	   a	   dollar-­‐per-­‐dollar	   drop	   in	   their	  current	  unemployment	  benefits.	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  such	  bunching	  at	  the	  disregard,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  do	  increase	  labor	  supply.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  McCall	  (1996).	  40	  McCall	  (1998).	  41	  Le	  Barbanchon	  (2017).	  
	   27	  
	  	  
European	  countries	  
	  Several	   recent	   studies	   focused	   on	   European	   countries	   rely	   on	   a	   timing-­‐of-­‐events42	  approach	   to	   separate	   the	   causal	   effects	   from	   the	   selection	   effects	   of	   entries	   by	  individuals	   into	   part-­‐time	   unemployment.	   	   This	   approach	   compares	   the	   behavior	   of	  groups	   of	   individuals	   who	   differ	   in	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   transition	   from	   full-­‐time	  unemployment	  to	  part-­‐time	  unemployment,	  assuming	  that	  this	  timing	  is	  random	  during	  their	   unemployment	   spell.	   In	   this	   set-­‐up,	   individuals	   who	   take	   up	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   benefits	   earlier	   in	   their	   unemployment	   spell	   belong	   to	   the	   treatment	  group,	   which	   is	   compared	   to	   the	   (control)	   group	   of	   individuals	   who	   take	   up	   these	  benefits	  later	  in	  their	  unemployment	  spell.	  	  	  Relying	  on	  this	  approach,	  	  researchers	  have	  found	  that	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  speeds	  up	   the	   access	   to	   regular	   employment	   in	   Finland. 43 	  The	   impact	   of	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   on	   access	   to	   regular	   jobs	   is	   large	   and	   significant:	   when	   the	   applicant	  takes	   up	   a	   short	   full-­‐time	   job	   that	   qualifies	   for	   part-­‐time	   benefits,	   the	   hazard	   rate	   to	  regular	  employment	  increases	  almost	  by	  one-­‐half.	  	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  subsidized	  part-­‐time	  jobs	   are	   less	   effective	   than	   short	   full-­‐time	   jobs	   in	   improving	   the	   chances	   of	   finding	   a	  regular	  job.	  Moreover,	  women	  working	  part-­‐time	  and	  benefiting	  from	  part-­‐time	  benefits	  do	   not	   exit	   unemployment	   faster	   than	   full-­‐time	   unemployed	   women	   and	   may	   even	  remain	  in	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  longer	  in	  some	  cases.	  	  Still	   relying	   on	   the	   timing-­‐of-­‐events	   approach,	   another	   contribution	   highlights	   the	  importance	  of	  the	  design	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  in	  Denmark.44	  Receiving	  part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   and	   working	   part-­‐time	   reduce	   unemployment	  durations	   on	   average.	   However,	   the	   sign	   and	   magnitude	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   benefits	   vary	   with	   individual	   characteristics	   and	   with	   the	   timing	   and	  length	   of	   the	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefit	   period.	   Longer	   spells	   of	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   benefit	   tend	   to	   prolong	   unemployment	   duration,	   in	   particular	   for	  married	  women,	  white	  collar	  workers	  and	  manufacturing	  workers.	  The	  effects	  are	  much	  less	  detrimental	   for	   young	  workers	   and	   immigrants	  with	   short	   supplementary	  benefit	  periods.	  	  	  Part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   are	   also	   estimated	   to	   foster	   access	   to	   regular	  employment	  for	  young	  women	  in	  Belgium.45	  The	  survivor	  rate	  in	  unemployment	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployed	  workers	  is	  reduced	  by	  27	  percentage	  points	  one	  year	  after	  the	  start	  of	  receipt	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits,	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  full-­‐time	  unemployed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Abbring	  and	  Van	  den	  Berg	  (2003).	  43	  Kyyrä	  (2010).	  44	  Kyyrä	  et	  al	  (2013).	  45	  Cox	  et	  al,	  (2012).	  This	  contribution	  uses	  the	  ‘timing	  of	  events’	  method.	  
	   28	  
workers.46	  	  	  	  It	  is	  	  also	  found	  that	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  exert	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  entries	  into	   regular	   employment	   in	   Switzerland.47	  The	   chances	   that	   participants	   in	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  programs	  will	  get	  a	  regular	  job	  15	  months	  after	  the	  start	  of	  the	  program	   are	   about	   7–9	   percentage	   points	   better	   than	   those	   of	   non-­‐participants.	   The	  effects	   are	   heterogeneous	   across	   workers.	   Part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   are	  ineffective	   for	  unemployed	  persons	  who	   can	   find	   jobs	   easily	   anyway,	   or	   are	   	   having	   a	  short	   unemployment	   spell.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   estimated	   that	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  is	  cost	  effective	  for	  the	  unemployment	  insurance	  system	  overall.	  The	  impact	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	   insurance	  has	  also	  been	  compared	  with	   that	  of	  non-­‐profit	  employment	  programs.	  The	  finding	   is	   that	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  are	  much	  more	  effective	  than	  non-­‐profit	  employment	  programs,	  because	  	  non-­‐profit	  employment	  programs	  do	  not	  improve	  access	  to	  regular	  non-­‐subsidized	  employment.	  	  	  Part-­‐time	  unemployment	   insurance	   seems	   to	   be	  much	   less	   effective	   in	   France	   than	   in	  other	  European	  countries.	  There	  is	  a	  negative	  lock-­‐in	  effect	  of	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	   when	   individuals	   are	   eligible	   for	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   and	   an	  increased	   transition	   rate	   to	   regular	   jobs	   once	   unemployed	   workers	   are	   no	   longer	  eligible. 48 	  These	   effects	   are	   significantly	   less	   important	   for	   low-­‐skilled	   and	   low-­‐experience	   unemployed	   workers,	   who	   face	   greater	   difficulties	   in	   finding	   jobs.	   This	  suggests	  that	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  creates	  incentives	  to	  remain	  longer	  in	  part-­‐time	  unemployment,	  and	  then	  seek	  regular	   jobs	  once	  the	  opportunity	  to	  get	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	   is	  exhausted.	  This	  situation	  is	   likely	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  badly	  designed	  scheme,	  which	  favors	  locking-­‐in	  effects.	  	  	  From	   this	   perspective,	   it	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   to	   examine	   the	   part-­‐time	  unemployment	   insurance	   system	   for	   artists	   and	   technicians	   employed	   in	   the	  entertainment	  sector	  in	  France.	  Many	  artists	  and	  technicians	  in	  the	  entertainment	  sector	  have	  several	  employers	  for	  limited	  periods	  of	  time.	  France	  has	  implemented	  a	  system	  to	  cope	   with	   these	   specificities,	   which	   resemble	   those	   of	   the	   platform	   economy	   that	   is	  likely	  to	  develop	  in	  future	  years.	  	  	  	  
Part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance	  for	  artists	  and	  technicians	  of	  the	  entertainment	  sector	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Contrary	   to	   the	   finding	  of	  Kyyra	  et	  al.	   	   (2013)	  described	  above,	  Cox	  et	  al.	  do	  not	   find	  that	   the	  spell	  of	  unemployment	  benefit	  affects	  the	  transition	  to	  regular	  employment.	  These	  results	  should	  be	  interpreted	  with	  caution	  since	  many	  transitions	  are	  missing	  in	  the	  data	  of	  Cox	  et	  al.	  Since	  the	  information	  on	  the	  labor	  market	   status	   is	   only	   available	   at	   the	   end	  of	   each	  quarter	   in	   their	  dataset,	   the	   timing	  of	   events	  method	  requires	   the	   assumption	   that	   at	   most	   one	   labor	   market	   transition	   may	   occur	   within	   a	   quarter.	   This	  assumption	   is	   very	  questionable	   for	  part-­‐time	  unemployed	  workers	   frequently	   employed	  on	  very	   short	  temporary	  jobs,	  shorter	  than	  one	  month.	  	  47	  Gerfin	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  analyze	  the	  impact	  of	  partial	  unemployment	  benefits	  on	  the	  chance	  of	  getting	  a	  job	  of	  duration	  of	  at	  least	  3	  months	  with	  earnings	  of	  at	  least	  90%	  of	  those	  in	  the	  previous	  job.	  48	  Fremigacci	  and	  Terracol	  (2013).	  This	  contribution	  uses	  the	  ‘timing	  of	  events’	  method.	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in	  France	  	  In	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  succession	  of	  fixed-­‐term	  contracts,	  with	  alternating	  periods	  of	  employment	  and	  unemployment,	  France	  has	  created	  a	  specific	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefit	  system	  for	  artists	  and	  technicians	  in	  the	  entertainment	  industry,	  who	  are	  known	  as	   intermittents	  du	  spectacle	  (show-­‐business	   intermittents).49	  This	  system,	   instituted	   in	  1936	   for	   visual	   technicians	   and	   filmmakers,	   was	   integrated	   into	   the	   general	  unemployment	   insurance	   system	   in	   1965	   and	   progressively	   extended	   to	   audio	  technicians,	   the	  whole	   audio-­‐visual	   sector,	   and	   the	   performers	   and	   technicians	   of	   the	  “live”	  performing	  arts.	  	  	  Show-­‐business	  intermittents	  must	  be	  either	  performing	  artists	  on	  a	  fixed-­‐term	  contract	  or	  blue-­‐collar	  workers	  or	  technicians	  in	  the	  entertainment	  industry	  working	  on	  a	  fixed-­‐term	  contract,	  with	  both	  their	  occupations	  and	  their	  hiring	  firm’s	  activities	  specified	  by	  collective	   agreement.	   To	   be	   entitled	   to	   unemployment	   benefits	   the	   intermittent	  employee	  must	  have	  worked	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  hours	  in	  a	  given	  period.	  The	  minimum	  period	  is	  507	  hours	  (or	  43	  days	  if	  the	  contract	  stipulates	  days	  of	  work	  instead	  of	  hours,	  in	  which	  case,	  one	  day	  is	  equal	  to	  12	  hours)	  during	  the	  last	  319	  days	  for	  the	  artists	  or	  the	  last	  304	  days	  for	  the	  blue-­‐collar	  workers	  and	  technicians.	  	  	  The	   level	   of	   benefits	   is	   calculated	   at	   the	   time	   of	   registration	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   reported	  hours	   and	   reported	   earnings	   during	   the	   12-­‐month	   base	   period.	   The	   net	   replacement	  rate,	  calculated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  daily	  wage,	  is	  about	  85%	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  minimum	  wage	  and	  70%	  at	  twice	  the	  minimum	  wage.	  If	  claimants	  are	  totally	  unemployed	  all	  along	  their	  claim	  and	  receive	  their	  unemployment	  benefits	  each	  month,	  the	  potential	  duration	  of	  benefits	  is	  243	  days	  (8	  months).	  	  	  Claiming	  intermittent	  workers	  are	  allowed	  to	  work,	  including	  with	  their	  past	  employers.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  level	  of	  unemployment	  benefits	  is	  reduced,	  and	  depends,	  each	  month,	  on	  reported	  hours	  of	  work	  while	  on	   claim.	  However,	   the	   reduction	   in	  benefits	  delays	   the	  potential	   benefit	   exhaustion	   date.	   At	   the	   exhaustion	   date,	   the	   eligibility	   condition	   is	  reassessed.	  If	  claimants	  have	  worked	  507	  hours	  over	  the	  12-­‐month	  period	  preceding	  the	  exhaustion	  date,	  they	  remain	  eligible	  for	  unemployment	  benefits,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  	  The	  intermittent	  du	  spectacle	  scheme	  is	  a	  striking	  example	  of	  the	  detrimental	  effects	  of	  a	  badly	  designed	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance.	  	  It	  provides	  little	  incentive	  to	  work	  	  beyond	   the	   minimum	   number	   of	   hours	   required	   to	   be	   entitled	   to	   unemployment	  benefits.	   It	   allows	   show-­‐business	   workers	   to	   combine	   earned	   income	   with	  unemployment	  benefits	  indefinitely,	   if	  they	  work	  at	  least	  2	  months	  over	  any	  10-­‐month	  period.	  This	  scheme	  is	  very	  attractive.	  Figure	  5	  shows	  that	  the	  number	  of	  show-­‐business	  workers	  has	  been	  multiplied	  by	  5	  between	  1980	  and	  2015,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  show-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  See	  Cahuc	  	  (2018)	  for	  more	  details.	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business	   workers	   claiming	   unemployment	   benefits	   jumped	   from	   7000	   to	   113,000.	   In	  2015,	  about	  40%	  of	  show-­‐business	  workers	  claimed	  unemployment	  benefits	  thanks	  to	  the	   intermittent	   scheme.	  Moreover,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	   intermittent	   show-­‐business	  workers	   quit	   whatever	   job	   they	   are	   in	   once	   they	   have	   acquired	   their	   eligibility	   for	  unemployment	  benefits,	  and	  only	  resume	  their	  activity	  when	  these	  are	  exhausted.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	  also	  fueled	  by	  employers'	  practices.	  A	  large	  proportion	  of	  compensated	  unemployment	  spells	  are	  attributable	  to	  comings	  and	  goings	  within	  the	  same	  company.	  This	   recurrence	   suggests	   that	   many	   companies	   have	   adapted	   their	   workforce	  management	   in	   order	   to	   take	   maximum	   advantage	   of	   the	   facilities	   provided	   by	  unemployment	  insurance.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5	  :	  The	  steady	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  arts	  workers	  and	  number	  of	  claiming	  arts	  workers	  from	  1980	  
to	  2015.	  Source:	  Data	  on	  claimants	  and	  non	  claimants	  over	  the	  1980-­‐1992	  period	  are	  taken	  from	  from	  Menger	  
and	  Gurgand	  (2011).	  Data	  on	  the	  total	  number	  of	  arts	  workers	  over	  the	  2005-­‐2015	  period	  are	  computed	  from	  
an	  administrative	  database	  on	  arts	  workers’	  contracts	  (Attestation	  Employeur	  Mensuelle).	  Data	  on	  claiming	  
arts	  workers	  over	   the	  1993-­‐2015	  period	  are	  computed	   from	  an	  administrative	  database	  on	  unemployment	  
spells	   (Fichier	   National	   des	   Allocataires).	   Note:	   linear	   extrapolation	   for	   the	   number	   of	   arts	   workers	   from	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The	   high	   cost	   of	   the	   intermittent	   scheme	   is	   clearly	   the	   consequence	   of	   very	   generous	  part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits.	   It	   has	   provoked	  many	   attempts	   at	   reform.	   But	   the	  strong	  opposition	  of	   show-­‐business	  workers,	  who	  organize	   numerous	  demonstrations	  when	  their	  scheme	  is	  threatened,	  have	  blocked	  important	  changes	  so	  far.	  	  	  	  
Lessons	  from	  the	  empirical	  literature	  on	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  	  	  The	   empirical	   literature	   indicates	   that	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   benefits	   can	   facilitate	  not	  only	  part-­‐time	  work	  but	  also	  re-­‐employment	  in	  regular	  jobs.	  Part-­‐time	  unemployed	  workers	   are	   matched	   with	   employers	   more	   frequently,	   and	   have	   more	   chances	   to	  maintain	   their	   skills	   and	   to	   enlarge	   their	   job	   network	   than	   full-­‐time	   unemployed	  workers.	  	  This	  allows	  part-­‐time	  unemployed	  workers	  to	  access	  regular	  jobs	  faster.	  	  All	  in	  all,	   the	  empirical	   literature	  suggests	   that	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	   insurance	  benefit	   is	  desirable,	   and	   indeed	   that	   it	   must	   play	   a	   key	   and	   increasing	   role	   to	   support	   the	  development	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  employment.	  	  	  However,	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  benefits	  may	   favor	   short	   and	  part-­‐time	   jobs	  at	   the	  expense	   of	   regular	   employment.	   	   The	   part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance	   benefit	   for	  show-­‐business	   workers	   in	   France	   shows	   that	   badly	   designed	   systems	   can	   have	  important	  detrimental	  effects,	  which	  are	  difficult	  to	  modify	  once	  in	  place.	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  adaptation	  of	  unemployment	  insurance	  to	  the	  development	  of	  new	  forms	  of	   employment,	  more	  unstable	   and	  more	  often	  part-­‐time,	   has	   to	   be	  undertaken	  cautiously.	  To	  limit	  the	  substitution	  of	  non-­‐regular	  employment	  for	  regular	  employment,	  the	   contributions	   of	   non-­‐standard	   workers	   should	   balance	   the	   benefits	   they	   receive.	  This	  requirement	  implies	  that	  their	  contributions	  to	  unemployment	  insurance	  could	  be	  substantial,	   as	   for	   standard	   employees.	   Several	   countries	   have	   introduced	   voluntary	  schemes	   for	   non-­‐standard	   workers	   to	   avoid	   raising	   contributions	   for	   non-­‐standard	  workers.50	  However	   the	   take-­‐up	   to	   these	   voluntary	   schemes	   is	   low	   and	   suffers	   from	  selection	  issues,	  insofar	  as	  workers	  with	  the	  highest	  risks	  of	  unemployment	  have	  more	  incentives	   to	   participate.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   it	   is	   desirable	   to	   implement	   equal	  mandatory	   contributions	   for	   standard	   and	   non-­‐standard	   workers	   and	   to	   adjust	   the	  eligibility	  conditions	  for	  each	  type	  of	  worker	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  contributions	  balance	  their	  benefits.	  This	  framework	  presents	  the	  advantage	  to	  avoid	  the	  selection	  issue	  and	  to	  facilitate	  transitions	  between	  standard	  and	  non-­‐standard	  employment.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  counsel	  and	  monitor	  part-­‐time	  unemployed	  workers	  to	  help	  them	  in	  finding	  full-­‐time	  jobs.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  OECD	  (2018)	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3.2.	  Wage	  insurance	  	  The	   scarcity	   of	   wage	   insurance	   programs	   entails	   that	   very	   few	   evaluations	   are	  	  available.51	  Nevertheless,	   evaluations	   of	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   programs,	   and	   in	   particular	  time-­‐limited	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   programs,	   are	   useful	   inasmuch	   as	   the	   potential	  effectiveness	  of	  	  wage	  insurance	  relies	  on	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  reemployment	  	  prospects	  of	  its	  recipients.	  	  
 
 
Evaluations	  of	  time-­‐limited	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  programs	  	  Several	   empirical	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   time-­‐limited	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   can	   promote	  employment	  among	   low-­‐wage	  workers.	  Four	   trials	   in	  Canada	  and	   in	   the	  United-­‐States	  have	   randomly	   assigned	   people	   either	   to	   a	   program	   group	   which	   was	   eligible	   for	  earnings	  supplements,	  or	  to	  a	  control	  group	  that	  was	  not.	  Their	  findings	  are	  consistent.52	  These	   	   programs	   all	   increased	   employment,	   earnings,	   and	   income.	   However,	   	   their	  effects	  diminished	  over	  time.	  The	  effects	  on	  employment	  and	  earnings	  were	  larger	  and	  more	   persistent	   for	   long-­‐term	   welfare	   recipients	   with	   limited	   education	   and	   work	  experience.	   The	   combination	   of	   time-­‐limited	   earnings	   supplements	  with	   employment-­‐related	   services	   aimed	   at	   helping	   those	   eligible	   to	   find	   and	   keep	   jobs	   has	   effects	   that	  exceed	   those	   from	   earnings	   supplements	   alone. 53 	  Evidence	   from	   an	   experimental	  program	  for	  unemployed	  welfare	  recipients	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  in	  line	  with	  these	  findings.54	  It	  found	   that	   time-­‐limited	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   combined	   with	   post-­‐employment	   services	  raised	   employment.	   Furthermore,	   positive	   but	   non-­‐significant	   effects	   on	   employment	  retention	   are	   observed.	   These	   results	   suggest	   that	   time-­‐limited	   in-­‐work	   benefits	   have	  temporary	  positive	  employment	  effects,	  which	  vanish	  when	  the	  benefits	  stop	  being	  paid.	  	  	  	  
Evaluations	  of	  wage	  insurance	  programs	  	  	  In	  1995	  and	  1996,	  the	  Canadian	  government	  tried	  out	  an	  experimental	  time-­‐limited	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  program	  	  called	  the	  Earnings	  Supplement	  Project.55	  Eligibility	  was	  limited	  to	  workers	  who	   experienced	   a	   permanent	   job	   separation	   after	   at	   least	   three	   years	   of	  continuous	  employment.	  Participants	  were	  offered	  payments	  of	  75%	  of	   their	  earnings	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Schochet	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  and	  Hyman	  (2018)	  evaluate	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Trade	  Adjustment	  Act	  in	  the	  United-­‐States,	  but	  their	  evaluations	  are	  not	  focused	  on	  the	  	  wage	  insurance	  component	  of	  this	  scheme.	  52	  Michalopoulos	  (2005),	  Card	  and	  Hyslop	  	  (2005).	  53	  Robins	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  54	  Dorsett	  	  (2014).	  55	  Bloom	  et	  al.	  (1999).	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loss	   for	  up	   to	   two	  years.	  They	   received	  a	  payment	  only	   if	   they	  became	  employed	   in	   a	  nearly	  full-­‐time	  job	  (32	  hours	  per	  week)	  within	  26	  weeks	  of	  the	  offer	  date.	  The	  program	  was	  tested	  on	  two	  groups	  comprising	  a	  total	  of	  5,912	  individuals	  in	  1995	  and	  1996.	  The	  program	   had	   a	   small	   positive	   and	   short-­‐lived	   impact	   on	   reemployment	   and	   negative	  effects	  on	  wages.	   It	  had	  almost	  no	  effect	  on	   the	  amount	  or	  duration	  of	  unemployment	  benefits.	  	  	  The	   effects	   of	   	   the	   wage	   insurance	   program	   for	   older	   workers	   in	   place	   in	   Germany	  during	   the	   period	   2003–2011	   have	   been	   evaluated	   by	   a	   field	   experiment.	   This	  experiment	   involves	   an	   information	   treatment	   which	   consists	   in	   sending	   information	  about	   the	   program	   to	   2,328	   eligible	   persons.	   Then,	   this	   treatment	   is	   used	   as	   an	  instrument	  to	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  program.	  Receipt	  of	  this	  information	  increased	  the	  share	  of	  individuals	  informed	  about	  the	  program	  by	  around	  20	  percentage	  points.	  A	  survey	  	  shows	  that	  	  more	  than	  70%	  of	  workers	  think	  that	  this	  program	  is	  suited	  to	  bring	  older	  unemployed	  individuals	  back	  into	  jobs.	  Only	  around	  20%	  answered	  that	  in-­‐work	  benefits	   stigmatize	   workers	   and	   around	   two-­‐thirds	   that	   they	   are	   preferable	   to	   wage	  subsidies	   to	  employers.	   	  Nevertheless,	   the	  employment	   impact	  of	   the	   in-­‐work	  benefits	  are	  mixed.	  	  For	  workers	  aged	  from	  50	  to	  54	  	  and	  	  60	  	  to	  64,	  receiving	  the	  information	  has	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	  employment.	  There	  is	  a	  small	  positive	  impact	  on	  employment	  of	  individuals	   aged	   from	   55	   to	   59.	   Moreover,	   there	   are	   small	   negative	   effects	   on	   the	  earnings	  of	  	  those	  aged	  from	  50	  to	  54.	  	  	  All	   	   in	   	   all,	   current	   evaluations	   do	   not	   provide	  much	   	   support	   for	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  wage	  insurance	  to	  boost	  employment.	  The	  employment	  impact	  of	  time-­‐limited	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  seems	  to	  be	  smaller	  for	  displaced	  workers	  than	  for	  welfare	  recipients,	  perhaps	  because	  they	  have	  higher	  reservation	  wages	  and	  need	  time	  to	  revise	  their	  expectations	  about	   their	   career	   prospects.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   combining	   wage	   insurance	   with	  counseling	  and	  employment-­‐related	  services	  could	  make	  wage	  insurance	  more	  effective.	  Much	  research	  is	  needed	  before	  convincing	  lessons	  can	  be	  drawn	  in	  this	  realm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.3.	  Short-­‐time	  work	  	  	  Empirical	  evaluations	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  can	  be	  classified	  in	  two	  broad	  categories.	  The	  first	   category	   relies	   on	   country-­‐level	   or	   cross-­‐sector-­‐level	   data,	   while	   the	   second	  category	  relies	  on	  firm-­‐level	  data.	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Macroeconomic	  evaluations	  	  Macroeconomic	  evaluations,	  using	  cross-­‐country	  data,56	  or	  cross-­‐state	  data	  in	  the	  United	  States,57	  have	  generally	  identified	  a	  positive	  impact	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  on	  employment.	  Their	  conclusions	  are	  mostly	  drawn	  from	  a	  small	  number	  of	  observations,	  limiting	  their	  ability	  to	  identify	  a	  causal	  relation	  between	  short-­‐time	  work	  and	  employment.	  	  This	  being	   said,	   it	   has	  been	   found	   that	   short-­‐time	  work	  did	   stabilize	   employment	   and	  reduced	   unemployment	   during	   the	   2008−2009	   recession.	  58	  	   A	   one	   percentage	   point	  increase	  in	  short-­‐time	  work	  compensation	  take-­‐up	  rates	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  decrease	  of	  one	   percentage	   point	   in	   unemployment	   and	   an	   increase	   of	   one	   percentage	   point	   in	  employment.	   Overall,	   these	   evaluations	   suggest	   that	   short-­‐time	   work	   compensation	  programs	  had	  an	  important	  impact	  on	  preserving	  permanent	  jobs	  during	  the	  economic	  downturn.	   The	   largest	   impacts	   were	   in	   Germany	   and	   Japan,	   where	   0.7−0.8%	   of	   jobs	  were	   saved.	   In	   contrast,	   short-­‐time	  work	   compensation	   seemed	   to	  have	  no	   significant	  impact	  on	  either	  the	  employment	  or	  the	  average	  hours	  of	  work	  of	  temporary	  workers.	  So	  macroeconomic	  evaluations	  suggest	  that	  the	  positive	  effect	  on	  permanent	  jobs	  is	  not	  countered	  by	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  temporary	  jobs.	  	  
Microeconomic	  evaluations	  	  Microeconomic	  evaluations	  are	  scarce	  and	  mostly	  use	  firm	  level	  sources	  in	  Germany	  and	  France.	  In	  Germany,	  all	  analyses	  rely	  on	  the	  IAB	  Establishment	  Panel,	  an	  annual	  survey	  with	  approximately	  16,000	  firms,	  representing	  1%	  of	  all	  firms	  and	  7%	  of	  all	  employees,	  interrogated	  in	  2003,	  2006	  and	  2009.	  Resulting	  estimates	  depend	  heavily	  on	  the	  method	  used	   to	  correct	   for	   selection	   into	  short-­‐time	  work,	  with	  no	  obvious	   lesson.59	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  in	  Germany	  seems	  to	  be	   the	   inadequacy	  of	  data	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  selection	   issue.	  This	   literature	  analyzes	   the	  impact	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  on	  employment	  by	  running	  regressions	  where	  employment	  growth	  is	  explained	  by	  short-­‐time	  work	  use	  and	  by	  a	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  including	  the	  revenue	  growth	  of	  the	  firm.	  But	  it	  has	  long	  been	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  correlation	  between	  employment	  and	  revenue	  is	  very	  weak	  overall	  and	  heterogeneous	  across	  firms.	  To	  avoid	  bias	  induced	  by	  selection	  of	  firms	  with	  specific	  adjustment	  of	  employment	  into	  short-­‐time	   work,	   this	   literature	   uses	   the	   prior	   experience	   of	   firms	   with	   the	   program	  when	   trying	   to	   instrument	   short-­‐time	  work.	  Using	   this	   approach,	   it	   is	   found	   that	   each	  employee	   on	   short-­‐time	   work	   saved	   about	   0.35	   jobs	   during	   the	   great	   recession	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Abraham	  and	  Houseman	  (1994),	  Boeri	  and	  Bruecker	  (2011),	  Brey	  and	  Hertweck	  (2016),	  Cahuc	  and	  Carcillo	  (2011),	  Hijzen	  and	  Martin	  (2013),	  Hijzen	  and	  Venn	  (2011),	  Van	  Audenrode	  (1994).	  57	  Abraham	  and	  Houseman	  (2014).	  58	  Boeri	  and	  Bruecker	  (2011),	  Cahuc	  and	  Carcillo	  	  (2011),	  Hizjen	  and	  	  Venn	  (2011).	  59	  Balleer	  et	  al.	  (2016),	  Boeri	  and	  Bruecker	  (2011),	  Niedermayer	  and	  Tilly	  (2017)	  find	  positive	  effects	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  on	  employment.	  Bellmann	  and	  Gerner	  (2011),	  Bellmann	  et	  al.	  (2015),	  Kruppe	  and	  Scholz	  (2014)	  find	  no	  effects	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  on	  employment.	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Germany	  -­‐-­‐	  with	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  equal	  to	  [0.04,0.70].60	  	  However,	  this	  result	  should	  be	   interpreted	   cautiously	   since	  empirical	   evidence	   shows	   that	   firms	  which	  use	  short-­‐time	  work	  tend	  to	  adjust	  employment	  more	  strongly	  when	  output	  falls	  than	  firms	  which	  do	  not	  use	  short-­‐time	  work.61	  This	  behavior	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  users	  may	  result	  from	  technical	  constraints:	  firms	  have	  more	  incentives	  to	  use	  short-­‐time	  work	  if	  features	  of	   their	   production	  process	   imply	   that	   it	   is	  more	   costly	   to	   store	  production	  or	   to	   find	  productive	   activities	   for	   incumbent	   employees	   when	   demand	   drops.	   Hence,	  instrumenting	  program	  use	  with	  prior	  experience	  does	  not	  fully	  solve	  the	  selection	  issue	  and	   is	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	  an	  underestimate	  of	   the	  potential	  positive	   impact	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  on	  employment.	  This	  may	  explain	  why	  several	  contributions	  using	  this	  instrument	  find	  no	  positive	  effect	  on	  employment.	  Studies	  using	  French	  data	  face	  a	  similar	  difficulty.	  Their	   results	   tend	   to	   show	   that	   establishments	   authorized	   to	  use	   short-­‐time	  work	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  go	  bankrupt.	  62	  	  More	  recent	  studies	  find	  positive	  employment	  effects	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  in	  France	  and	  in	   Italy.	   Cahuc	   et	   al.	   (2018)	   devise	   a	   causal	   identification	   strategy	   based	   on	   the	  geography	  of	  the	  program.	  They	  find	  that	  short-­‐time	  work	  saved	  jobs	  in	  firms	  faced	  with	  large	   drops	   in	   their	   revenues	   during	   the	   Great	   Recession,	   in	   particular	   when	   highly	  levered,	  but	  only	   in	   these	   firms.	  The	  measured	  cost	  per	  saved	   job	   is	  shown	  to	  be	  very	  low	  relative	  to	  that	  of	  other	  employment	  policies	  because	  short-­‐time	  work	  targets	  those	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  destroyed.	  The	  identification	  of	  	  Giupponi	  and	  Landais	  (2018)	  relies	  on	  the	   interaction	  between	   two	  sources	  of	   variation	   in	  eligibility	   in	   Italy:	   sector	  and	   firm	  size.	   They	   find	   large	   and	   significant	   negative	   effects	   of	   short-­‐time	   work	   on	   hours	  worked,	  but	  large	  and	  positive	  effects	  on	  headcount	  employment.	  	  Contrary	  to	  Cahuc	  et	  al.	   for	   France,	   employment	   effects	   disappear	   when	   the	   program	   stops.	   Giupponi	   and	  Landais	  also	  identify	  the	  presence	  of	  significant	  negative	  reallocation	  effects	  of	  STW	  on	  employment	  growth	  of	  untreated	  firms	  in	  the	  same	  local	  labor	  market.	  	  All	   in	   all,	   empirical	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   short-­‐time	  work	   can	   be	   effective	   at	   saving	  jobs	   in	   recessions.	   However,	   empirical	   evidence	   is	   still	   scarce	   and	   insufficient.	  Macroeconomic	  studies	  tend	  to	  find	  positive	  effects	  on	  permanent	  jobs,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  excluded	   that	   these	   results	   are	   partly	   driven	   by	   confounding	   variables.	   The	   findings	  relying	   on	   firm	   data	   are	   scarce	   and	   have	   difficulties	   in	   identifying	   a	   causal	   impact	   of	  short-­‐time	  work.	  More	  research	  is	  needed	  in	  this	  area.	  	  	  	  
4.	  Concluding	  remarks	  	  At	   the	  start	  of	   the	  XXI	   century,	   characterized	  by	   the	  rise	   in	  new	   forms	  of	  employment	  and	   in	   skills	   requirements,	  many	   or	  most	   countries	   need	   to	   adapt	   their	   labor	  market	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  In	  line	  with	  Boeri	  and	  Bruecker	  (2011)	  61	  Bellmann	  et	  al.	  (2015).	  62	  Calavrezo	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  rely	  on	  propensity	  score	  matching	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  selection	  issue.	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institutions	  to	  accompany	  technological	  changes	  and	  globalization.	  Workers	  need	  to	  be	  insured	  against	  career	  disruptions,	   to	  have	  a	  chance	   to	  adapt	   their	   skills,	   and	   to	  move	  from	  job	  to	  job	  smoothly.	  In	  this	  context,	  unemployment	  insurance	  is	  an	  essential	  tool	  to	  foster	  and	  smooth	  career	  paths.	  Its	  core	  components	  comprise	  unemployment	  benefits	  paid	   to	   full-­‐time	  unemployed	  workers,	   	  monitoring,	  and	  counseling.	  But	   it	   is	  clear	   that	  they	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  cover	  all	  risks	  properly.	  In	  particular,	  the	  growth	  of	  new	  work	  arrangements	  leading	  to	  more	  unstable	  work	  relations	  requires	  adapting	  the	  system	  to	  deal	  with	   high	   frequency	  moves	   between	  periods	   of	   activity	   and	  periods	   of	   inactivity.	  The	   large	   losses	   suffered	   by	   long-­‐tenured	   displaced	  workers	   due	   to	   globalization	   and	  technological	  change	  may	  require	  specific	  actions.	  	  	  Part-­‐time	   unemployment	   insurance,	   short-­‐time	   work,	   and	   wage	   insurance	   all	   aim	   at	  	  dealing	  with	   	   these	   	   issues.	   	  Over	   	   the	   last	   	   decades,	   they	  have	  been	   tried,	   at	  different	  scales	   in	  several	  countries,	  and	  evaluated,	   to	  a	   lesser	  extent,	  by	  economists	  and	   	  social	  scientists.	   From	   our	   survey	   of	   	   these	   experiments	   and	   evaluations,	   we	   can	   draw	   the	  following	  lessons.	  	  	  	  	  First,	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance,	  	  which	  exists	  	  in	  many	  countries,	  is	  desirable.	  It	  must	  indeed	  play	  a	  key	  and	  increasing	  role	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  new	  forms	  of	   employment.	   However,	   the	   adaptation	   of	   unemployment	   insurance	   to	   the	  development	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  employment,	  more	  unstable	  and	  more	  often	  part-­‐time,	  has	  to	   be	   undertaken	   cautiously.	   To	   limit	   the	   substitution	   of	   non-­‐regular	   employment	   for	  regular	   employment,	   the	   contributions	   of	   non-­‐standard	   workers	   should	   balance	   the	  benefits	   they	   receive.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   it	   is	   desirable	   to	   implement	   equal	  mandatory	   contributions	   for	   standard	   and	   non-­‐standard	   workers	   and	   to	   adjust	   the	  eligibility	  conditions	  for	  each	  type	  of	  worker	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  contributions	  balance	  their	  benefits.	  This	  framework	  presents	  the	  advantage	  to	  avoid	  the	  selection	  issue	  and	  to	  facilitate	  transitions	  between	  standard	  and	  non-­‐standard	  employment.	  	  	  Second,	  due	  to	  capital	  market	  imperfections,	  short-­‐time	  work	  can	  be	  effective	  at	  saving	  jobs	   in	   recessions.	   It	   can	   avoid	   inefficient	   job	   destructions.	   However,	   the	   scarcity	   of	  empirical	  	  evaluations	  entails	  that	  our	  knowledge	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  is	  quite	  limited.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  short-­‐time	  work	  should	  be	  limited	  to	   firms	   facing	   genuine	   difficulties,	   and	   time-­‐limited	   to	   avoid	   reducing	   hours	   worked	  excessively	  and	  dampening	   the	   reallocation	  of	   jobs	   toward	  productive	   firms.	   It	   should	  also	  be	  experience-­‐rated	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  abusive	  and	  repeated	  use.	  	  	  Third,	  to	  date	  the	  rare	  evaluations	  we	  do	  have	  of	  the	  scarce	  wage	  insurance	  systems	  that	  do	   exist	   provide	   little	   support	   for	   the	   two	   arguments	   advanced	   by	   the	   proponents	   of	  wage	  insurance.	  These	  arguments	  were	  clearly	  expressed	  by	  President	  Obama	  when	  he	  argued	  that	  if	  a	  “hardworking	  American	  loses	  his	  job—we	  shouldn’t	  just	  make	  sure	  that	  he	   can	   get	   unemployment	   insurance;	   we	   should	  make	   sure	   that	   program	   encourages	  him	   to	   retrain	   for	   a	   business	   that’s	   ready	   to	   hire	   him.	   If	   that	   new	   job	   doesn’t	   pay	   as	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much,	   there	  should	  be	  a	  system	  of	  wage	   insurance	   in	  place	  so	   that	  he	  can	  still	  pay	  his	  bills”.	   Sustaining	   “hardworking”	   people	   can	   be	   desirable,	   but	   as	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  distinguish	   them	   from	   mere	   insiders,	   wage	   insurance	   is	   difficult	   to	   justify	   on	   equity	  grounds.	  Its	  implementation	  risks	  benefiting	  the	  insiders	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  outsiders.	  	  Moreover,	   	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  time-­‐limited	  in-­‐work	  benefits	  provided	  by	  wage	   	   insurance	   systems	   have	   little	   incentive	   effects	   for	   individuals	   to	   find	   and	   keep	  regular	  jobs.	  	  	  These	  conclusions	  call	  for	  two	  additional	  remarks.	  	  	  First,	   there	   is	   very	   little	   empirical	   evidence	   about	   the	   consequences	   of	   large-­‐scale	  schemes	  likely	  to	  significantly	  favor	  sustained	  and	  inclusive	  growth.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  short-­‐time	  work	  and	  wage	  insurance.	  	  Given	  that,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  conclusions	  of	  this	  paper	  reflect	  the	  current	  state	  of	  our	  limited	  knowledge;	  they	  are	  not	  definitive,	  they	  may	  evolve	  with	  the	  results	  of	  future	  evaluations.	  	  	  Second,	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   demand	   for	   insurance	   expressed	   by	   interest	   groups	   whose	  purposes	  are	  not	  necessarily	  aligned	  with	  the	  general	  interest.	  	  This	  observation	  applies	  to	  short-­‐time	  work	  and	  wage	  insurance,	  which	  can	  benefit	  the	  insiders	  at	  the	  expenses	  of	  the	  outsiders.	  It	  also	  applies	  to	  part-­‐time	  unemployment	  insurance,	  which	  can	  benefit	  professions	   or	   sectors	   facing	   unstable	   work	   relations,	   at	   the	   expenses	   of	   other	  professions	  or	  sectors.	  This	  means	  that	   the	   implementation	  of	  new	  insurance	  schemes	  	  should	   be	   undertaken	   cautiously,	   and	  must	   rely	   on	   empirical	   evidence	   demonstrating	  their	  effectiveness.	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